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Abstract. This is an empirical study of Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement of the antitrust
laws. Its purpose is fourfold:
1. To update Posner’s study “A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement” (Posner, 1970, pp. 365–
419).
2. To provide consistent and comparable measures of antitrust enforcement effort by the Depart-
ment of Justice.
3. To report these measurements in a concise and systematic way in order to encourage empirical
studies of antitrust issues.
4. To explore some implications for antitrust issues.
The purpose is to present the overall historical record of DOJ antitrust activity as well as some
patterns in that history. More detailed analysis is left for future work.
The following information for cases undertaken by the DOJ are reported: number of cases, choice
of civil or criminal remedies, alleged violations, corporate officials prosecuted, won-loss record, civil
and criminal sanctions imposed, and length of the proceedings. The principal source of data is the
CCH Trade Regulation Reporter, commonly referred to as the CCH Bluebook which contains brief
summaries of all DOJ antitrust cases in order of their filing.
Key words: Antitrust enforcement, Sherman Act.
* Joseph C. Gallo presented portions of this material to the Walton-Bittlingmayer Session at
the Western Economic Association Meetings, San Diego, California, June, 1990; the Industrial
Organization Society Session at the American Economic Association Meetings, Washington, D.C.,
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We deemed it useful to update Posner’s statistical compilation of antitrust enforce-
ment (Posner, 1970). This study updates that compilation by providing complete,
consistent and comparable measures of the Department of Justice’s more recent
antitrust enforcement efforts. Not only is such an update useful in its own right,
enabling us to explore some implications for antitrust policy examined by Posner
as well as other issues, but also the availability of such a series will foster empirical
studies of antitrust issues.1
The following information for cases undertaken by the DOJ are reported by
years and semi-decades: number of cases, choice of civil or criminal remedies, pat-
tern of alleged violations, corporate officials prosecuted, won-loss record, civil and
criminal sanctions imposed, and length of the proceedings. The principal source
of data is the CCH Trade Regulation Reporter, commonly referred to as the CCH
Bluebook, which contains summaries of all DOJ antitrust cases in order of filing.
When corporate defendants are listed in the Fortune 500 in the year of their alleged
offense, they are classified as large firms and coded as a subcategory for separate
analysis.
I. The Number of Antitrust CCH Cases and Cases (Investigations)
The number of antitrust cases initiated by the DOJ is of interest primarily as a
measure of the level of antitrust enforcement (Posner, 1970, p. 367).2 With a re-
liable measure of the level of antitrust enforcement, it is possible to test a variety
of hypotheses such as whether the level of enforcement is pro- or counter-cyclical,
whether antitrust enforcement declines during wartime and whether the level of
antitrust enforcement is affected by political factors such as the party affiliation
of the President. Although DOJ prosecutions provide only a partial picture of all
antitrust enforcement effort, omitting FTC, state, and private enforcement efforts,
DOJ enforcement efforts constitute an important, if not the dominant, component
of American antitrust enforcement.
1. CCH CASES VERSUS CASES OR INVESTIGATIONS
As a measure of antitrust enforcement, a simple enumeration of cases reported
by the CCH may be deceptive for two reasons. The same case is reported by the
CCH at several stages in its proceedings. To avoid this double counting, Posner’s
Laboratory at the University of Cincinnati for their assistance in organizing the data. This work
was supported in part by the Charles Phelps Taft Memorial Fund. All errors and omissions are the
responsibility of the authors.
1 In addition to the analysis presented herein see Gallo et al. (1985) (1986) (1994); Gallo and
Goshal (1996); and Craycraft et al. (1997).
2 Because of the nature of law enforcement, however, the number of DOJ cases also reflects
the extent of antitrust violations and the probability of being caught. Variations in the number of
cases reflect these changes in antitrust environment as well as changes in the intensity of antitrust
enforcement efforts.
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methodology of disregarding all civil and criminal contempt proceedings, indict-
ments, informations and ancillary civil cases from cases as reported by the CCH
was followed.3 Secondly, several individual cases reported by CCH may be the
result of a single Departmental investigation. Once a case is initiated, other related
offenses may be found – one informer leads to another, one deposition leads to
another, one grand jury leads to another. The result may be a large number of
cases while the DOJ investigation may be limited to a single local industry.4 To
adjust for this phenomenon, Posner’s methodology was followed in constructing
an alternate measure of enforcement effort (Posner, 1970, fn. 3, p. 367). Cases
reported by CCH which flow from a common investigation are counted as one
consolidated case or investigation. The consolidations are based on information
contained in the proceedings of each case as reported by the CCH. In keeping
with Posner’s terminology, in this study “cases” refers to consolidated cases or
investigations while each case reported by the CCH is reported as a “CCH case”,
e.g., “cases” count consolidated cases as one case while “CCH cases” counts each
case reported separately. For purposes of dating, each consolidated case is treated
as if it originated in the same year as the first CCH case included in the consolidated
case or investigation.
2. RECORD OF CCH CASES VERSUS CASES
Table I records cases as reported by Posner for 1890–1969 as well as our count
of cases and CCH cases. The number of such cases involving “Fortune 500”
defendants for 1955–1997 also is recorded.
The overlap between Posner’s study and our study for the years 1955–1969
allows us to compare our consolidation procedure with that of Posner’s. The differ-
ences between Posner’s cases and our cases result from the subjective nature of the
consolidation process. In general our consolidation process produced a somewhat
greater degree of consolidation than Posner’s during the overlap period.5
Comparing the number of CCH cases and cases from 1955 to 1997, one finds the
measures of CCH cases and cases are closely related during the period of Posner’s
3 The Antitrust Division normally files an ancillary civil case with any criminal indictment against
conduct which has not clearly been terminated. Such civil cases seldom establish significant pre-
cedents as they lead only to an injunctive restatement of the ruling in the context of the particular
industry.
4 For example, on December 14, 1979, the DOJ filed an information suit charging Freddie A.
Ferrell of bid rigging on road building projects for the state of Tennessee. This investigation resulted
eventually in forty-three cases reported by the CCH (“Task Force Reviews . . . ” 1989).
5 As a result of consolidation, Posner’s cases were about thirteen less than the CCH cases per year
for the overlap years (1955–1969). This amounts to about a 24 percent decrease in his cases from the
CCH cases reported for the period. Our consolidations reduced the CCH cases by about eighteen per
year representing about a 35 percent reduction from the CCH cases. Given the subjective nature of the
process of consolidation and the lapse of time, it was not possible to replicate Posner’s consolidation
process even with his assistance. During the overlap period, our process resulted in a somewhat
smaller number of cases–about five or six per year.
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Table I. Number of antitrust cases
Cases CCH cases
Posner Gallo With With
et al. fortune fortune
500 firms 500 firms
1890–94 9 – – – –
1895–99 7 – – – –
1990–04 6 – – – –
1905–09 39 – – – –
1910–14 91 – – – –
1915–19 43 – – – –
1920–24 66 – – – –
1925–29 59 – – – –
1930–34 30 – – – –
1935–39 57 – – – –
1940–44 223 – – – –
1945–49 157 – – – –
1950–54 159 – – – –
1955 34 32 8 40 11
1956 30 29 13 36 18
1957 38 29 10 49 18
1958 47 41 18 51 21
1959 46 33 15 63 24
1955–59 195 164 64 239 92
1960 35 33 10 87 52
1961 47 42 26 59 38
1962 56 50 28 91 48
1963 26 27 13 34 16
1964 51 42 22 67 38
1960–64 215 194 99 338 192
1965 35 25 12 36 19
1966 36 30 11 39 16
1967 34 26 8 52 10
1968 47 44 16 50 20
1969 43 37 18 44 21
1965–69 195 162 65 221 86
1970 – 48 19 60 29
1971 – 36 15 43 17
1972 – 63 21 81 25
1973 – 39 16 50 19
1974 – 34 18 50 20
1970–74 – 220 89 284 110
1975 – 32 8 42 9
1976 – 38 11 47 12
1977 – 29 7 45 8
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Table I. Continued
Cases CCH cases
Posner Gallo With With
et al. fortune fortune
500 firms 500 firms
1978 – 34 12 46 14
1979 – 28 8 42 8
1975–79 – 161 46 222 51
1980 – 42 13 111 13
1981 – 16 3 70 5
1982 – 24 7 107 7
1983 – 25 5 109 3
1984 – 20 8 92 10
1980–84 – 127 36 489 38
1985 – 17 2 42 2
1986 – 14 4 57 4
1987 – 17 – 97 –
1988 – 20 2 69 2
1989 – 15 4 76 3
1985–89 – 83 12 341 11
1990 – 29 5 69 7
1991 – 36 6 98 9
1992 – 25 2 84 2
1993 – 29 6 87 9
1994 – 35 9 54 9
1990–94 – 154 28 392 36
1995 – 25 2 59 2
1996 – 32 9 74 9
1997 – 26 4 30 4
Sub total 946
(1890–1954 – Posner)
Sub total 1,348 454 2,689 631
(1955–1997 – Gallo et al.)
Total cases 2,294
(1890–1954 Posner + 1955–97 Gallo et al.)
Source: CCH Bluebook.
Notes: 1. The following CCH cases were omitted from count: – Case
#3260 was reserved.
– Case #3536 alleged income tax evasion.
2. The calculation of the number of cases includes only civil and
criminal CCH cases.
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Figure 1. Department of Justice antitrust enforcement.
study, but diverge sharply around 1980. This change in 1980 reflects, in part, a
change in DOJ enforcement policy during the Reagan years to increase intensive
investigations in limited product and geographic markets. This change in policy
resulted in a greater number of CCH cases being initiated from each investigation.
Figure 1 portrays graphically the differences among the data bases for the overlap
period and between CCH cases and cases.
Which is a better measure of antitrust enforcement – cases or CCH cases? That
depends, of course, on the purpose of the measurement. The category of “Cases”
reflects the intensity while “CCH cases” reflects the breadth of the DOJ enforce-
ment effort.6 In order to compare our results with Posner’s, it is necessary to use
cases in some instances and CCH cases for others. It is not always clear from his
work, however, when Posner used cases and CCH cases. We report also statistics
not reported by Posner such as types of defendants in criminal and civil cases,
positions within the firm held by individual defendants, won-loss records based
on defendant’s positions within the firm, etc. In reporting these statistics, we used
CCH cases as the basic unit of analysis since we want to report the breadth of this
type of enforcement. For some of the measures, it was not logical or even possible
to aggregate CCH cases into cases.
The anomaly of decreasing cases and increasing CCH cases in the 1980s can be
interpreted with the help of two alternative measures of enforcement – the number
of defendants and the real level of expenditures on DOJ antitrust enforcement.
6 The deviation between cases and CCH cases is a source of conflicting views of antitrust en-
forcement efforts in the 1980s which is addressed in footnote 20. The anomaly of decreasing cases
and increasing CCH cases during the 1980s is apparent in Table I and Figure 1.
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Counting individuals and corporate defendants, the number of defendants dropped
from 1,170 for 1980–1984 to 711 for 1985–1989 (see Table VIII). During the
same period, the real budget for DOJ antitrust enforcement dropped by more than
45 percent.7 The decrease in cases, therefore, is consistent with the decrease in
enforcement effort indicated by the alternative measures.8
II. Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Activity
What explains the variation in DOJ enforcement efforts? Posner suggested the level
of economic activity might be one determinant and considered three alternative
hypotheses:
First, the level of antitrust enforcement might be positively related to the level
of economic activity. Both the incentive to violate antitrust laws and the re-
7 The number of lawyers employed by the Division in the 1980s fell by 51 percent from 422 to
254, and the number of economists fell by 11 percent from 45 to 40 (Shepherd, 1991, p. 129).
8 Neither cases nor CCH cases reflect the relative importance among cases. The historic AT&T di-
vestiture case in 1974 counts the same as the prosecution of an obscure county highway construction
price-fixing conspiracy.
There are a variety of means of dealing with this difficulty. For example, “large firms” are more
likely to generate “important cases”. One criterion of largeness is whether the firm is listed in the
various annual listing published in the Fortune Directory U.S. Corporations and its precursors. We
used this criterion to identify “large firms” reported in Table I and subsequent analysis. Service firms,
unfortunately, are not included in the above listings. Adjustments can be made, however, by including
service firms with annual sales equivalent to the firms included in the directories. Kovacic used this
criterion in a recent study of CCH cases from 1973–1988 (Kovacic, 1989). He found that the DOJ
initiated 233 CCH cases from 1973–1980, 58 of which (26 percent) involved large firms. Of these 58
cases, 46 charged horizontal restraints, five alleged attempts to monopolize or monopolization, four
involved vertical restraints, and three interlocking directors cases. In contrast, from 1981–1988, he
found nine cases, less than 2 percent, of the 574 cases initiated by the DOJ involved large firms. One
of the nine (American Airlines) alleged an attempted monopolization. The remaining eight dealt with
horizontal price fixing and consumer allocation schemes.
Another criterion of largeness is listing in Moody’s Industrial Manual which lists firms with annual
sales in excess of $200 million or have common stock traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ.
Using this list to identify “large firms” in a study involving price-fixing cases, it was found that of the
1,282 firms convicted of horizontal per se violations during the period from 1955 through 1990, 193,
or slightly less than 15 percent, were large firms as indicated by the listing in Moody’s (Craycraft et
al., 1997).
Bittlingmayer suggested “important cases” might be identified independently of the size of the firm
by examining the number of news stories each generates (or even whether they generate news stories)
or the number of subsequent citations in other legal opinions. Each case could then be weighted by
these numbers. This is for the future.
We followed Posner in using another approach to identifying “important cases.” Cases cited in
leading casebooks in antitrust law are identified as “Landmark cases.” “Landmark” cases are used to
examine the influence of political parties on enforcement (see Posner, 1970, Table 35, and Table III
in this paper with surrounding discussions).
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sources available to prosecute such violations increase as the economy expands,
and decrease as the economy contracts (Posner, 1970, p. 367).9
Second, the level of antitrust enforcement might be related negatively to the
level of economic activity. The public demands a scapegoat and believes that eco-
nomic contractions are aggravated, if not caused, by monopolies. The pressures
to commit white collar crime, some of which fall under the antitrust laws, also
increase during such periods.10 Antitrust enforcement increases, therefore, as the
economy contracts.
Third, the level of antitrust enforcement decreases in a war period because of
direct government control of the economy, or because antitrust prosecutions are
deemed to be divisive or distractive at such times (Posner, 1970, p. 368).
Posner tested these hypotheses by comparing the number of antitrust cases in
each year with the level of real GNP and whether or not the U.S. was at war. He
found a positive relation between the number of cases and real GNP for 1890–1940.
From 1940 to 1970 the number of cases did not increase significantly even though
there was a significant increase in real GNP (1970, p. 367). Posner concluded there
was no strong positive or negative relation between the number of cases and real
GNP. No support for his war hypothesis was indicated (Posner, 1970, p. 368).
The more recent data recorded in Table I and Figure 2 support Posner’s con-
clusions. From 1955 to 1972 the number of cases did not increase significantly
despite a growth in real GNP – a finding similar to Posner’s for 1940–70. The
relationship was even weaker during the 1980s as the number of cases decreased
significantly (although CCH cases increased) despite growth in the real GNP.11
9 Another explanation for the procyclical theory is an implication of Peltzman’s general theory
of regulation. According to the Peltzman model “regulation will tend to be more heavily weighted
toward ‘producer protection’ in depressions and toward ‘consumer protection’ in expansion”. This
hypothesis is an extension of the argument that firms have a greater incentive to collude, or to
seek protective legislation and other forms of government protection, during downturns to avoid
“cutthroat” competition resulting from excess productive capacity. This was observed clearly in the
1930s. The Peltzman hypothesis is based also on antitrust enforcement to protect consumers from
monopoly prices caused by firms restricting output which is more likely to occur during an expansion.
These two tendencies of the Peltzman’s model imply that antitrust enforcement will tend to be
procyclical, intensifying when demand increases and abating as demand declines. Our recent data
gives no support to Peltzman’s prediction that regulatory activity to limit price increases will fall
when demand falls (Peltzman, 1976, p. 211).
Moore argues that consumers benefit in expansions because regulation prevents prices from rising
as much as they might and that producers gain in contractions because regulation prevents prices
from falling as rapidly as they would otherwise (Moore, 1982, pp. 29–32).
10 In her study of the cyclical behavior of antitrust violations, Simpson takes the position that
economic downturns increase criminal behavior. She hypothesized further, however, that the in-
creased criminal behavior might be masked by a reluctance on the part of regulators to investigate
and prosecute such violations during severe downturns (Simpson, 1987, pp. 944–945, 949–951).
11 Gallo and Goshal (1996) examined the economic determinants of antitrust enforcement. Various
measures of antitrust enforcement were used including all DOJ cases, cases against Fortune 500
firms, and horizontal cases. The analysis shows a statistically significant decrease in enforcement
following an increase in economic activity. The majority of the impact on these measures of enforce-
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Figure 2. DOJ cases and real GNP 1987 constant dollars.
If there is a relationship between antitrust violations and/or enforcement and the
business cycle, it is weak.
No support for Posner’s war hypothesis was found. During the early years of
the United States involvement in Vietnam from 1961 to 1966 the number of cases
decreased, but during the latter period from 1967 to 1973 the number increased.12
III. Politics as an Explanation of Antitrust Enforcement
1. POLITICAL PARTY OF THE PRESIDENT
Another explanation for the variation in the number of cases considered by Posner
was the party affiliation of the President (Posner, 1970, pp. 411–413). Many assume
the political parties have different economic philosophies and, therefore, antitrust
enforcement as measured by the number of cases brought may be influenced by
these philosophies. It is assumed that “pro-consumer” Democratic administrations
would pursue intensive enforcement policies while “pro-business” Republican ad-
ministrations would be less stringent in enforcing antitrust statutes. Tables II and
III permit analysis of this hypothesis.
ment comes from a lag of one to two years. The results are robust to alternate indicators of economic
activity which include stock market indexes, absolute and relative measures of corporate profits, and
business cycle indicators. These conclusions are similar to Simpson who found a negative relation
between her measures of profit squeeze and antitrust violations but it was significant only for stock
prices. Her study tracked the criminal violations of fifty-two firms from 1927 to 1981. Her measure
of violations included Federal Trade Commission cases against false advertising as well as FTC and
DOJ antitrust cases. Although she characterizes these as supportive findings (Simpson, 1987, pp.
951–954), they appear little stronger than the absence of support for a positive relation we found.
12 For a discussion of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War see, Herring (1979).
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Table II. DOJ cases by presidential term
Term Party in Number of Number of
White House cases CCH cases
1890–1892 R 6 –
1893–1896 D 7 –
1897–1900 R 3 –
1901–1904 R 6 –
1905–1908 R 36 –
1909–1912 R 61 –
1913–1916 D 42 –
1917–1920 D 42 –
1921–1924 R 58 –
1925–1928 R 51 –
1929–1932 R 23 –
1933–1936 D 24 –
1937–1940 D 113 –
1941–1944 D 158 –
1945–1948 D 126 –
1949–1952 D 148 –
1953–1956 R 103 118
1957–1960 R 136 250
1961–1964 D 161 251
1965–1968 D 125 177
1969–1972 R 184 228
1973–1976 R 143 189
1977–1980 D 133 244
1981–1984 R 85 378
1985–1988 R 68 265
1989–1992 R 105 327
1993–1996 D 121 274
1997 D 26 30
Total 2,294 2,731
Source: computed from Table I.
Note: Figure for CCH cases 1953–1956 is estimated using
Posner’s cases for 1953–1954 and CCH cases for 1955–
1956.
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Table III. “Landmark” cases by presidential term
Term Party Areeda and Handler Sullivan and Average
Kuplow et al. Hovenkamp
1890–92 R 0 0 0 0
1893–96 D 0 1 0 0.33
1897–00 R 0 0 2 0.67
1901–04 R 0 0 1 0.33
1905–08 R 0 0 0 0
1909–12 R 1 3 1 1.67
1913–16 D 0 0 2 0.67
1917–20 D 2 2 2 2.00
1921–24 R 1 3 0 1.33
1925–28 R 3 0 2 1.67
1029–32 R 0 0 1 0.33
1933–36 D 0 0 1 0.33
1937–40 D 2 2 2 2.00
1941–44 D 1 2 0 1.00
1945–48 D 6 4 6 5.33
1949–52 D 2 1 0 1.00
1953–56 R 3 3 4 3.33
1957–60 R 2 3 4 3.00
1961–64 D 5 10 9 8.00
1965–68 D 3 5 6 4.67
1969–72 R 3 3 3 3.00
1973–76 R 1 1 1 1.00
1977–80 D 5 6 12 7.67
1981–84 R 5 5 9 6.33
1985–88 R 5 9 9 7.67
1989–92 R 4 8 8 6.67
1993–96 D 3 5 4 4.00
1997–98 D 0 1 1 0.67
Sources: P. Areeda and L. Kuplow, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text,
Cases, 5th edn. (1997).
M. Handler, H. Blake, R. Pitofsky and H. Goldschmidt, Trade Regulation:
Cases and Materials, 4th edn. (1997 and 1998 supplement).
E. Sullivan and H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Policy and Procedure:
Cases and Materials, 3rd edn. (1994 and 1998 supplement).
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Table II reports for each four-year period since 1890 the identity of the party in
the White House and the number of cases brought by the DOJ as well as the CCH
cases after 1953. Table III makes a similar report for “landmark cases” as identified
in well-known antitrust casebooks.
The influence of the party affiliation of the President on antitrust enforcement
depends on the period examined. For the entire period from 1890 through 1997,
Democratic administrations initiated 53 percent of the cases while Republican ad-
ministrations accounted for 47 percent. Democrats occupied the White House 45
percent of the time, so their proportionate share of the 2,294 (Table I) cases would
have been 1,032 cases; they brought 1,226. From 1937 through 1976, Democrats
occupied the White House 60 percent of the time and instituted a comparable share
of the cases.13
In recent times, coinciding roughly with the period of this study (1953–1997),
Democrats occupied the White House 38 percent of the time and instituted slightly
more than 41 percent or 566 cases. Based on time in office, their proportionate
share would have been 528. This more-than-proportionate share was the result
largely of the precipitous decline in cases during the Reagan-Bush years. If the
Reagan-Bush years are excluded from the 1953–1997 period, Democrats initiated
somewhat less than their proportionate share.14
The analysis above is based on cases in order to preserve compatibility with
Posner. Table II reports also CCH cases since 1953. From 1953–1997, each party
initiated CCH cases in about the same percentage of time they occupied the White
House.15
2. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Another test of the impact of politics on antitrust enforcement is whether cases
initiated in Presidential election years were above or below average. If presidential
politics are not a factor in antitrust enforcement, on average 25 percent of DOJ
cases should be initiated each year, including election years. From 1936 through
1969 slightly less than 27 percent of the DOJ cases were initiated in Presidential
13 Of the 1,397 cases, Democratic administrations brought 831 cases (59 percent) and Republican
administrations brought 566 (41 percent).
14 The Democrats occupied the White House 52 percent of the time and initiated 50 percent of the
total cases (566 of the 1132). Their proportionate share would have been 589. Republicans brought
the same number of cases (566) in the 48 percent of the time they occupied the White House. Their
proportionate share would have been 543.
15 Democrats initiated 36 percent of the CCH cases (976 of a total of 2731) compared to their 38
percent control of the Presidency. The comparable figures for the Republican administrations are 64
percent of the CCH cases (1755 of the 2731) compared to their 62 percent occupancy of the White
House.
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Figure 3. DOJ cases initiated by presidential term.
election years (Posner, 1970, p. 412). Our findings are similar to Posner’s in that
Presidental elections had little effect on antitrust prosecution.16
3. CHANGE IN PARTIES
Another means of detecting the influence of party politics is to examine variations
in antitrust enforcement that accompany a change in the party in the White House.
Posner compared the enforcement level in the first term of the new party with
the enforcement level of the previous party. We refined this test by comparing the
number of cases brought in the second year after a party change to the average level
of enforcement of the previous administration.17 The results are shown in Figure 3.
The shaded bars indicate the number of cases brought in the second year after a
party change and the unshaded bars indicate the average number of cases brought
during the period of the previous party. No systematic tendency of one party to
increase or decrease antitrust activity upon taking office was apparent which is the
same conclusion reached by Posner (1970 pp. 412–413).
16
. Simpson and others, using a different methodology and including FTC administrative actions,
found “. . . political variables do appear to be related to antitrust crime” . . . in that “. . . Republican
administrations consistently ‘produce’ more antitrust criminality” (Simpson, 1987, pp. 955–956).
17 Supply and demand forces that affect antitrust enforcement are likely to change during a Pres-
idential term. A presidential term, therefore, is too long a period to reflect only the impact of party
change of the White House on the level of antitrust enforcement. Bureaucratic inertia is likely to
dominate the first year after a party change. We used, therefore, the second year after a party change
to test for influence of party on antitrust enforcement.
88 JOSEPH C. GALLO ET AL.
4. PARTIES AND FRONTIERS OF ENFORCEMENT
The effects of politics may be on the quality of or innovations in antitrust prosecu-
tions rather than quantity of cases prosecuted. Landmark Supreme Court decisions,
establishing significant new points of law as identified in antitrust casebooks,18 are
a useful measure of the importance of the enforcement efforts. These cases are re-
ported in Table III. Since the enactment of the Sherman Act, Democrats have been
in the White House 45 percent of the time; their proportionate share of landmark
cases, therefore, would be 37.0 using the average of the three sources examined in
Table III. They have exceeded this share with 39.0 cases.19 This is similar to the
effect Posner found for 1890–1965. The Democratic share should have been 22.9
Landmark cases; they brought 24.1 such cases (1970, p. 412).
5. CONCLUSION
Based on the above analysis, the party in power did not have much influence on
the quantity or quality of DOJ antitrust enforcement. If there is a political effect on
antitrust enforcement, it is weak. It remains possible, of course, that politics can
be reflected through the legislative oversight process or on specific enforcement
actions (Faith et al., 1987; Calkins, 1997, pp. 159–161).
The assumption that Democratic administrations would pursue active en-
forcement policies while Republican administrations would be less stringent in
enforcing antitrust statutes, therefore, oversimplifies the situation. It may be accur-
ate, however, to say that Democratic administrations are more likely to explore
the frontiers of enforcement while Republican administrations are more likely
to retreat from those frontiers. The relative vigor of their antitrust enforcement,
however, is contrary to the basic assumption. Democratic antitrust policy seems to
operate at the extensive margin while Republic policy concentrates on the intensive
margin.20
18 There are some obvious flaws in this analysis in separating significant contributions to the law
and prosecutional effort. For purposes of comparison with Posner’s study, however, his method was
followed.
19 Republicans controlled the Presidency 55 percent of time; therefore, their proportionate share
would have been 41.1 Landmark cases. The actual number was 37.0. There is no statistical evidence
from the landmark cases to support hypotheses that depressions or wars had an effect on the level of
antitrust enforcement.
20 Contrary to expectations that the Eisenhower administration would favor business and mute
antitrust policy, antitrust enforcement was surprisingly strong and innovative (see Kovaleff, 1980).
The emphasis of antitrust policy under the Reagan-Bush administrations was in the area of enforce-
ment. In general, the DOJ pursued criminal offenses – Sherman Act cases involving horizontal per
se offenses – vigorously. No new cases over matters involving price discrimination, nonprice vertical
restraints, and resale price maintenance were initiated. As noted above enforcement effort in terms of
cases declined precipitously in the 1980s even though the number of CCH cases increased. Antitrust
enforcement against “Fortune 500” firms virtually disappeared. As two of the authors of this study
have expressed it elsewhere,
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IV. The Choice of Remedy: Civil or Criminal
The significance of the DOJ’s decision to proceed criminally or civilly against a de-
fendant is a matter of some debate within the law and economics literature. Under
the traditional price theory of criminal sanctions proposed by Becker (1968), there
would seem to be little economic significance to this decision since both involve
sanctions, albeit of different magnitude, that would increase the expected costs
of engaging in antitrust violations. More recently, however, Dau-Schmidt (1990)
and others distinguish civil from criminal punishment by arguing that criminal
punishment, particularly imprisonment, not only increases the expected price of
the crime but also discourages preferences for criminal activity. Calkins argues a
civil fine has a smaller deterrent effect than a comparable criminal fine (Calkins,
1997, pp. 145–146).
From a legal perspective, the DOJ’s decision to pursue a case as a civil or
criminal violation has a profound impact on the case, especially with regard to
the procedural rights of the defendant, the burden of proof, and the sanctions for
which the defendant may be liable. The decision to initiate a case as a civil or
criminal matter depends on the strength of the evidence as well as the prosecutor’s
evaluation of the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the defendant
(Sullivan, 1977, pp. 759–769). Table IV presents the DOJ’s antitrust cases since
1890 categorized as criminal (CR), civil (CV), or mixed (CR/CV).21
There are a number of ways of organizing the eras of antitrust enforcement. For
the purposes of this paper, Shepherd’s is most useful. He identified three waves in
enforcement activity: 1904–1920, 1937–1953, and 1967–1974 (Shepherd, 1991).
Shepherd’s structure will be utilized, in general, in the discussions which follow.
1. THE EARLY YEARS TO THE 1920S
Antitrust enforcement was divided evenly between criminal and civil cases from
1890 through 1914 (94 criminal and 101 civil cases), although the pattern differed
within subperiods. For 1890–1904, the low level of antitrust enforcement was
primarily civil prosecutions. A total of 16 civil cases were instituted while only
6 criminal indictments were sought. The initial success in enforcing the Sherman
Act, in Jellico Mountain, was a civil case. Excursions into criminal cases were
not as successful. Other than peripheral antitrust cases involving labor organizers
The 1970s were devoted to pushing back the frontiers of antitrust policy. The exploration of
unknown areas of frontiers is time-consuming and expensive. Many of these explorations failed.
Antitrust enforcement under the Reagan administration is an intense cultivation of well-known
terrain. It is efficient, cost-effective, and limited. Camelot was more interesting but the question
of socially optimal antitrust policy is still open. (Gallo et al., 1985, p. 127)
Antitrust enforcement under the Clinton administration appears to be returning to explorations of the
frontiers of antitrust enforcement especially with regard to large corporations.
21 Since a single investigation may yield both criminal and civil cases, some consolidated cases
are mixtures.
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Table IV. DOJ cases and CCH cases criminal and civil
Cases CCH cases
# % # %
Year CR CV CR/CV CR CV CR/CV CR CV CR CV
1890–94 4 5 – 44 56 – – – – –
1895–99 1 6 – 14 86 – – – – –
1900–04 1 5 – 17 83 – – – – –
1905–09 26 13 – 67 33 – – – – –
1910–14 37 54 – 41 59 – – – – –
1915–19 25 18 – 58 42 – – – – –
1920–24 25 41 – 38 62 – – – – –
1925–29 16 43 – 27 73 – – – – –
1930–34 11 19 – 37 63 – – – – –
1935–39 27 30 – 47 53 – – – – –
1940–44 163 60 – 73 27 – – – – –
1945–49 58 99 – 37 63 – – – – –
1950–54 73 86 – 46 54 – – – – –
1955 13 16 3 41 50 9 21 19 53 48
1956 10 18 1 35 62 3 17 19 47 53
1957 15 11 3 52 38 10 26 23 53 47
1958 16 23 2 39 56 5 26 25 51 49
1959 8 18 7 24 55 21 34 29 54 46
1955–59 62 86 16 39 52 9 124 115 52 48
1960 2 24 7 6 73 21 31 56 36 64
1961 11 24 7 26 57 17 20 39 34 66
1962 8 26 16 16 52 32 38 53 42 58
1963 12 14 1 44 52 4 17 17 50 50
1964 10 27 5 24 64 12 21 46 31 69
1960–64 43 115 36 22 59 19 127 211 38 62
1965 5 20 0 20 80 0 8 28 22 78
1966 12 18 0 40 60 0 19 20 49 51
1967 4 19 3 15 73 12 13 39 25 75
1968 11 30 3 25 68 7 16 34 32 68
1969 1 36 0 3 97 0 1 43 2 98
1965–69 33 123 6 20 76 4 57 164 26 74
1970 9 38 1 19 79 2 10 50 17 83
1971 4 31 1 11 86 3 9 34 21 79
1972 13 47 3 21 75 5 23 58 28 72
1973 12 24 3 31 62 8 20 30 40 60
1974 17 15 2 50 44 6 30 20 60 40
1970–74 55 155 10 25 71 4 92 192 32 68
1975 19 13 0 59 41 0 27 15 64 36
1976 18 19 1 47 50 3 26 21 55 45
1977 16 12 1 55 41 3 28 17 62 38
1978 20 13 1 59 38 3 33 13 72 28
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Table IV. Continued
Cases CCH cases
# % # %
Year CR CV CR/CV CR CV CR/CV CR CV CR CV
1979 12 15 1 43 54 4 22 20 52 48
1975–79 85 72 4 53 45 2 136 86 61 39
1980 16 24 2 38 57 5 81 30 73 27
1981 8 8 0 50 50 0 56 14 80 20
1982 11 13 0 46 54 0 90 17 84 16
1983 15 8 2 0 32 8 101 8 93 7
1984 9 11 0 45 55 0 76 16 83 17
1980–84 59 64 4 47 50 3 404 85 83 17
1985 10 5 2 59 29 12 36 6 86 14
1986 8 6 0 57 43 0 50 7 88 12
1987 10 7 0 59 41 0 82 15 85 15
1988 9 10 1 45 50 5 58 11 84 16
1989 9 6 0 60 40 0 70 6 92 8
1985–89 46 34 3 55 41 4 296 45 87 13
1990 16 13 0 55 45 0 55 14 80 20
1991 23 13 0 64 36 0 82 16 84 16
1992 14 11 0 56 44 0 71 13 85 15
1993 21 8 0 72 28 0 78 9 90 10
1994 10 25 0 29 71 0 28 26 52 48
1990–94 84 70 0 55 45 0 314 78 80 20
1995 11 14 0 44 56 0 40 19 68 32
1996 6 24 2 19 75 6 44 30 60 41
1997 4 21 1 15 81 4 8 22 27 73
Subtotal 564 577 – 49 51 – na na na na
(1890–1954 – Posner)
Subtotal 488 778 82 36 58 6 1,642 1,047 61 39
(1955–1997 – Gallo et al.)
Total 1,052 1,355 82 41 55 3 na na na na
(1890–1997)
Source: See Source for Table I.
Note: Civil/criminal contempt, investigation, ancillary civil, others and information suits are
eliminated from the list of CCH cases. The number of cases in these categories for 1955 to
1997 appears below:
Type of case # %
Criminal Contempt 23 6
Grand Jury Investigation 47 11
False Statements to Grand Jury 15 4
Information 125 29
Civil Contempt 11 3
Ancillary Civil 198 47
Total 419 100
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for contempt in violating injunctions, little success was achieved with criminal
prosecutions. The first successful criminal price-fixing case did not occur until
1902.22 From 1905 through 1909, 26 criminal cases and only 13 civil cases were
filed. For the remainder of the period, 1910 through 1919, 62 criminal cases and
72 civil cases balanced out the totals for the period.
While a number of labor organizers were imprisoned for violating the antitrust
laws during 1915-1937 (Posner, 1970, p. 391), it was not until 1921 that a business
person, convicted of price fixing, actually served time in jail. The second occasion
arose on September 27, 1922.23
2. THE NEW DEAL TO POST-WWII
During the early years of the New Deal, criminal enforcement was minimal–the
DOJ instituted an average of less than ten cases per year. During the ten years
(1925-1934), the government pursued more than twice as many civil cases as
criminal cases. Although a number of defendants were imprisoned for violating
the antitrust laws during this decade, none were imprisoned purely based on price
fixing charges absent charges involving intimidation, threats, or violence.
Even after the revival of antitrust enforcement in 1938, criminal enforcement
dominated only one of the subsequent eight five-year periods (1935–1974). For
1935–1939, the fifty-seven cases were divided almost equally between civil (53
percent) and criminal (47 percent). During war years criminal cases played a
dominant role. Of the 223 cases from 1940 through 1944, 163 (73 percent) were
criminal cases. Except for 1905–1909, this was the only period before 1975–1979
when criminal enforcement was dominant. These two periods of unusually high
levels of criminal enforcement showed also the greatest increase in the number
of cases over the previous period. They appear, therefore, to be anomalies in the
balance between criminal and civil cases in the early years of antitrust enforcement.
22 The concept of corporate criminal liability developed slowly in American law, and it would
appear that the Sherman Act was an exception to the general state of the law in 1890. The prohib-
itions in the Sherman Act were expressed as restrictions against “persons.” A specific clause had
to be added to extend those (original Section 7) restrictions to corporations and associations since
corporate criminal liability was contrary to the general state of the law of the time.
Corporations are legal fictions, and legal fictions cannot commit criminal acts. Nor can they
possess mens rea, a guilty state of mind. Only people can act and only people can have a guilty
state of mind. For these reasons, it was accepted at common law and until early 1900s in the
United States that only people could commit crimes. Corporations might bear civil liability
for crimes committed by agents acting within the scope of employment, but corporate criminal
liability did not exist (Fischel and Sykes, 1996, p. 320).
It was not until 1908 that the Supreme Court established the possibility of criminal corporate liability
in the law in general in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States 212 U.S.
481 (1909). See Calkins (1997, p. 129) on corporate criminal liability.
23 United States v. Alexander & Reid Co. 280 F. 924 (1921) and United States v. J.E. Williams. C
4744 4974 (1922).
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3. 1945–1974
Antitrust enforcement in the post war period from 1945 through 1974 generally
remained high relative to the pre-1938 level although not as high as 1940–1944.
The dominance of civil enforcement continued. Of the 316 cases instituted during
the first decade (1945–1954), 131 cases (41 percent) were criminal. For the next
twenty years (1955–1974), civil enforcement dominated DOJ’s enforcement effort.
The DOJ instituted 740 cases and 1,082 CCH cases of which 65 percent of the cases
and 63 percent of the CCH cases were civil.24
4. 1975–1997
In contrast to the earlier periods, criminal enforcement dominated from 1975
through 1994. The dominance of criminal over civil, however, is more apparent
in the number of CCH cases than cases. Of the 525 cases over the period, 274 (53
percent) were criminal and 240 (46 percent) were civil. There were 1,444 CCH
cases of which 1150 (80 percent) were criminal prosecutions. This conflicting
picture of antitrust enforcement for cases and CCH cases reflects the case con-
solidation discussed in Section I.1 above. It is apparent that multiplicity of CCH
cases resulting from a single investigation is more likely to occur in criminal than
civil cases.
The pattern in Table IV becomes more complex after 1994 reflecting the diver-
gence of cases and CCH cases. Civil cases returned to dominance for cases while
criminal prosecutions remained dominant for CCH cases until 1997.
V. The Nature of the Offense
Antitrust laws prohibit a variety of actions that are distinguishable in law and
economic theory. These actions are categorized as horizontal restraints, monopoliz-
ation, exclusionary practices, vertical restraints, and horizontal or vertical mergers.
Some actions, such as horizontal restraints, are treated under the law as per se
violations while others, such as vertical restraints, fall under the rule of reason
(Sullivan, 1977, pp. 195–197). Economists have been concerned traditionally with
horizontal rather than vertical violations arguing that market power can exist only
with horizontal restraints (Bork, 1978). Vertical restraints are viewed as the ef-
ficient integration of the production and distribution process. Recent literature,
however, takes issue with that view (Riordan and Salop, 1995). The pattern of
alleged violations reveals something of the DOJ’s enforcement priorities with re-
spect to the types of offenses and relative importance of horizontal and vertical
violations.
24 Although civil enforcement dominated the DOJ’s enforcement effort, the 1959 McDonough Co.
case and the famous 1960 electrical equipment cases appeared to be turning points in the attitude of
the courts toward criminal penalties imposed under the Sherman Act (Gallo et al., 1994, p. 40).
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1. VIOLATIONS ALLEGED
Violations alleged in CCH cases for 1955–1997 are presented in Table V. Alleged
violations are reported since they reflect DOJ enforcement efforts whether or not
the cases resulted in a determination or acknowledgement of guilt.
CCH cases are classified into six categories: (1) horizontal per se violations
(HPSV) which includes bid rigging, price fixing, fixed terms of sales, base point
pricing and market, territory and consumer allocation schemes; (2) monopoly viol-
ations (MON) which includes monopolization and the act of acquiring a monopoly;
(3) exclusionary practices (EP) which includes predatory pricing, price discrim-
ination, boycott, reciprocity, tying arrangements, misuse of patents or threatening
patent action, and exclusive dealings; (4) vertical restraints (VERT) which includes
resale price maintenance and other restrictions imposed by the manufacturer on the
franchisee or dealer; (5) horizontal merger violations (HM); and (6) non-horizontal
merger violations (NHM) which includes product extension merger, conglomerate
merger and vertical mergers. These categories are compatible with those used by
Posner.25
Of the 2,689 CCH cases since 1955 (Table I), 2,542 alleged violations (Table V)
were determined from the CCH Trade Regulation Reporter information.26 From
1955 through 1997, horizontal per se and merger issues dominated the DOJ’s
antitrust enforcement occurring in 95 percent of the CCH cases. Horizontal per
se violations alone occurred in 80 percent of the total CCH cases. Slightly more
than 81 percent of 1,924 horizontal per se cases were criminal prosecutions. Hori-
zontal merger cases comprised the next largest category followed by exclusionary
practices and monopoly cases. There were only a few non-horizontal merger and
vertical restraint cases. Most of the exclusionary practice cases and merger cases
date from 1955 to 1973. The majority of monopolization, vertical restrictions and
non-horizontal merger cases fell in the 1960s or 70s. The DOJ’s focus on criminal
prosecution of horizonal per se violations and horizontal mergers intensified since
25 The small differences in definitions do not cause significant problems in comparing results.
For example, Posner made a distinction between conspiracies among manufacturers to establish
resale price and resale price maintenance by a single-manufacturers. He included multiple-firm resale
price maintenance cases in the horizontal conspiracy category which corresponds to our horizontal
per se violation category and reserved the resale maintenance category for single-firm resale price
maintenance cases. We do not make such a distinction and group all resale price maintenance in the
vertical restraint category along with tying arrangements. Posner reserved a separate category for
tying arrangements. The monopolization category in our data includes all CCH cases in which a firm
or group of firms attempt to obtain or enhance their monopoly position through merger or consol-
idation and attempts by large firms to restrict entry or drive their competitors out of business unless
they agree to the large firms policies. Posner employed separate categories for price discrimination,
boycott, exclusive dealings, and patent cases. We group these violation together in the exclusionary
practice category along with reciprocity cases.
26 In the 2,689 CCH cases, violations were not reported or the reported violations did not meet our
classification scheme in 278. Some cases involved multiple violations. As a result the 2,542 alleged
violations occurred in 2,411 CCH cases.
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Table V. CCH cases by type of alleged violations
Non-merger cases Merger cases
HPSV MON EP VERT HM NHM
CV CR CV CR CV CR CV CR CV CV
1955 11 13 5 0 5 5 1 1 5 0
1956 7 17 7 0 4 2 1 0 2 4
1957 9 24 1 0 4 2 1 0 1 0
1958 14 20 3 0 3 6 1 1 5 0
1959 17 33 9 0 9 4 0 0 6 3
1955–59 58 107 25 0 25 19 4 2 19 7
1960 40 31 10 0 7 1 0 0 9 1
1961 18 17 19 1 3 8 0 0 12 5
1962 34 37 11 0 2 1 2 0 7 4
1963 5 16 1 0 4 1 1 0 2 3
1964 26 20 1 0 2 0 1 0 11 4
1960–64 123 121 42 1 18 11 4 0 41 17
1965 9 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 4
1966 3 19 0 0 1 1 2 0 11 2
1967 19 12 0 0 3 0 0 0 6 3
1968 3 16 0 0 6 0 0 0 9 8
1969 11 1 1 0 4 0 0 0 15 2
1965–69 45 56 1 0 14 1 2 0 51 19
1970 8 7 0 0 7 0 0 0 14 5
1971 5 9 0 0 4 0 1 1 19 6
1972 21 23 0 0 14 0 2 0 17 0
1973 10 18 3 2 4 0 0 0 4 7
1974 6 29 1 0 3 0 0 0 5 2
1970–74 50 86 4 2 2 0 3 1 59 20
1975 7 26 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0
1976 6 25 0 0 4 0 0 0 6 1
1977 8 27 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 2
1978 2 33 1 0 1 0 0 0 7 1
1979 6 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 1
1975–79 29 133 2 0 5 2 0 0 26 5
1980 15 80 0 0 1 0 0 1 8 2
1981 4 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1
1982 8 89 0 0 1 0 0 0 7 0
1983 3 101 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
1984 8 76 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0
1980–84 38 401 0 0 2 0 0 1 28 3
1985 1 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1
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Table V. Continued
Non-merger cases Merger cases
HPSV MON EP VERT HM NHM
CV CR CV CR CV CR CV CR CV CV
1986 0 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1987 0 76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1988 0 57 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
1989 0 68 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
1985–89 1 274 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 1
1990 0 54 0 0 1 0 0 0 10 0
1991 2 77 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0
1992 4 69 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0
1993 1 75 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
1994 0 27 0 0 1 0 1 0 10 0
1990–94 7 302 0 0 3 0 1 0 39 0
1995 3 39 0 0 3 0 1 0 8 0
1996 3 38 1 0 6 0 3 1 10 0
1997 4 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 2
TOTAL 361 1,563 75 3 108 33 18 5 302 74
HPSV – Horizontal Per Se Violations including price fixing, bid rigging, fixed terms of sale, base-
point pricing, and market, territory and customer allocations schemes.
MON – Monopoly Violations including monopolization and attempts to monopolize.
EP – Exclusionary Practices including predatory pricing, price discrimination, boycott, reciprocity,
tying arrangements, misuse of or threats of patent actions, and exclusive dealing.
VERT – Vertical Violations including resale price maintenance or other restrictions on franchisee or
dealers.
HM – Horizontal Merger Violations.




Source: See Source for Table I.
Note: Civil/criminal contempt, investigation, ancillary civil, and information suits are eliminated
from the list of cases. We were able to classify 2,542 of the 2,690 alleged violations cited in civil
and criminal cases (see Table I).
1980. Of the 1,242 CCH cases since that date, the DOJ has prosecuted only 28 (2
percent) that were not horizontal per se violations or horizontal mergers. The ratio
of criminal to civil prosecutions in the horizontal per se violations has gone from
roughly one-to-one in the 1960s to seventeen-to-one in the 1980s.27
27 Assistant Attorney General Whalley has described this stricter prosecution of horizontal per se
violations as an attempt by the DOJ to change the widespread perception that antitrust violations
of these types are technical violations or non-serious crimes. In the view of the DOJ, they are
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2. HORIZONTAL PER SE VIOLATIONS
Table VI records characteristics of horizontal per se violations (HPSV). The num-
ber of HPSV exceeds the number of CCH cases because of multiple violations
in CCH cases.28 The multiple number of CCH cases associated with a case (or
investigation) has already been noted.
The number of HPSVs involving intraindustry organizations such as trade and
professional organizations decreased–no intra-industry organizations were cited as
defendants in 1985–1989. The percentage of HSPV CCH cases involving ancillary
agreements such as territory and customer allocations schemes has remained fairly
constant.29
Of particular interest, but of little surprise, is the large number of HPSVs in
Table VI which involve the government as a buyer. Of the 866 CCH cases involving
the government as a buyer, 705 (81 percent) were prosecuted after 1980.
The average number of defendants per CCH case in the 1980s is significantly
lower than in previous decades. Conspiracies attacked in recent years are of shorter
duration and involve smaller conspiracy sales.30 It is apparent also from Table VI
that in recent years a large number of CCH cases involved local and regional mar-
kets with multiple CCH cases resulting from a single case (or investigation). Since
1980 the number of CCH cases involving a national conspiracy has been stable at
serious crimes that impede free forces of competition, distorts the allocation of resources, and have
no redeeming social benefits (Whalley, 1988, p. 569).
28 The number of HPSV per CCH case has remained relatively staple at less than 1.5 violations
per case except for 1960–1964 and 1985–1994 when it rose to almost two per case. Reflecting the
consolidation of CCH cases into cases, the pattern of HPSV per case is quite different. Prior to 1980,
with the exception of 1960–1964, the violations per case were about two. There was a significant
upward shift in violations per case beginning in 1980. It reached 12 violations per case in 1990–1994
and remains well above the pre-1980 level.
29 Approximately 21 percent of the HPSV in CCH cases involved territory allocation schemes and
14 percent involved customer allocation prior to the 1980s. Since 1980, the percentages were 23
and 18 respectively. An anomaly occurred in 1990–1994 when 74 percent of the HPSV CCH cases
involved either territory or customer allocation schemes.
30 When reported for CCH cases in the Bluebook, conspiracy sales were calculated as the future
value of the conspiracy sales as reported compounded by the three month treasury bill rate from
the date of the conspiracy to the date sanctions are imposed. For example, if the Bluebook reported
conspiracy sales of $37.5 million over a period from 1957 through 1960, sanctions were levied on
February 5, 1965, and the end date of the conspiracy was December 31, 1960; the value of conspiracy
sales were calculated by compounding to February 5, 1965. In another example, if the Bluebook
indicated a conspiracy began as early as 1957, continued to at least October, 1960, and conspiracy
sales amounted to $9.4 million in 1960; conspiracy duration was calculated from the begin date,
January 1, 1957 to the earliest end date of October 1, 1960. Conspiracy sales were calculated by
multiplying the duration of three years and ten months by the annual conspiracy sales of $9.4 million.
The indictment date is used when no end date is given. Some caution should be taken in interpreting
these findings, of course. The Bluebook is not always clear as to the dates of the conspiracies, whether
it continued through out the period or was intermittent, or the amount of conspiracy sales. This is
symptomatic of the inadequacy of the summaries and the paucity of economic evidence in many of
the cases.
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Table VI. Characteristics of forizontal per se violations
Period
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995




HPSVs 200 439 128 194 238 628 503 577 130 3,037
CCH cases 165 244 101 136 162 439 275 309 93 1,924




CCH cases 61 26 26 39 33 23 0 2 2 212





CCH cases 31 99 16 16 11 65 75 110 5 428





CCH cases 18 19 13 27 33 21 55 120 5 311




CCH cases 4 87 10 19 41 371 155 165 14 866
cases 4 15 6 8 18 30 13 19 0 113
Other bid-rigging
CCH cases 3 20 5 14 22 7 50 64 40 225
cases 3 15 5 10 12 6 9 20 11 91
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Table VI. Continued
Period
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995




CCH Case 7.1 6.5 6.3 5.2 6.9 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.5 3.9
Avg. duration of
conspiracy
(years) 7.4 6.2 6.6 7.1 7.8 3.7 4.0 5.8 2.6 5.4
Av. conspiracy
sales affected




CCH cases 94 97 47 91 125 414 243 221 59 1,391
cases 51 49 35 64 79 64 39 54 15 450
Nationwide conspiracy
CCH cases 63 137 48 39 32 22 28 24 18 411
cases 47 54 17 27 25 19 6 15 7 217
International
CCH cases 8 10 2 6 5 3 0 1 11 46
cases 7 4 2 4 4 3 0 1 3 28
Source: See Sources for Table I.
a relatively low level. Those involving international markets largely disappeared
until 1995–1997.
3. MONOPOLIZATION VIOLATIONS AND EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES
A large percentage of the monopolization cases reported in Table VII involved
multiple-firm monopolies or aggressive cartels rather than single-firm monopol-
ies. Dissolution or divestiture was used as a remedy in only a small number of
monopolization cases. Most monopoly cases involved national markets.
Of the exclusionary practice cases, reciprocity comprised the largest category
(24 percent), followed by exclusive dealings (21 percent), boycott (17 percent),
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Table VII. Monopoly, exclusionary practice, and vertical restraint
CCH cases
Type of violation Periods
1955–1979 1980–1997
# of # of
cases cases
I. Monopoly Cases 78 1
Single-firm Monopolies 27 0
Single-Firm-Patents 0 0
Multiple-Firm Monopolies 51 1
Multiple-Firm-Patents 0 0
Cases with Dissolution or
Significant Divestiture 16 0
II. Exclusionary Practice Cases 127 14
Total Violations Alleged 140 15
Violation Alleged:
Price Discrimination 22 2
Boycott 24 2
Reciprocity 36 1
Tying Arrangements 11 3
Misuse of Patents or
Threatening Patent Action 18 2
Sabotaging Competitors 0 1
Exclusive Dealing 29 4
III. Vertical Restriction Cases 16 7
Total Violations Alleged 16 7
Violations Alleged:
Resale Price Maintenance 14 7
Single-Firm (RPM) 7 5
Multiple-Firm (RPM) 7 2
Restrictive Requirements on
Franchisers or Dealers 2 0
Source: See Source for Table I.
price discrimination (15 percent), patent issues (13 percent), tying arrangements
(9 percent), and sabotage (1 percent). The majority (91 percent) of the vertical
restraint cases reported in Table VII alleged resale price maintenance agreements
with 52 percent involving single-firm and 39 percent multiple-firm resale price
maintenance agreements.
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4. COMPARISON WITH POSNER’S FINDINGS
These findings with respect to the nature of the offenses alleged are similar to
Posner’s on several counts. First, horizontal per se cases dominated DOJ’s antitrust
enforcement in both studies (Table V and Posner, 1970, Table 23). Second, a large
number of horizontal per se cases involved local and regional conspiracies. Third,
divestiture or dissolution was not a common remedy in monopolization cases in
either study (Table VII and Posner, 1970, Tables 29–30). Fourth, horizontal merger
cases dominated the DOJ’s enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act (Table V
and Posner, 1970, Table 30).
Some differences between these findings and Posner’s are worthy of note. First,
a smaller portion of the horizontal price-fixing cases involved intraindustry organ-
izations. Second, conspiracies in recent years are of shorter duration with fewer
conspirators than in Posner’s results. Third, a significantly smaller percentage of
the price-fixing agreements involved national or international conspiracies in this
study (Table VI and Posner, 1970, Tables 24–25). Fourth, a smaller percentage
of the monopolization cases involved aggressive cartels than reported by Posner
– slightly more than 65 percent in this study (Table VII) compared to 80 percent
reported by Posner (1970, p. 404).
VI. Defendants
1. INDIVIDUALS VERSUS FIRMS
Should enforcement efforts be directed at firms or the individuals responsible for
the alleged violation? Becker and others argue that firms are the most appropriate
subject for antitrust prosecution since it is more likely that they will be able to
pay a commensurate fine, thereby assuring efficient deterrence without the need
for costly imprisonment. The possibility of prosecution and penalties provide firms
with adequate incentive to control the behavior of their agents. In addition, punish-
ing individuals is inappropriate as it is often difficult to identify the most culpable
individual in a corporation (Becker, 1968; Breit and Elzinga, 1986, Ch. 6; Elzinga
and Breit, 1976, pp. 38–40, 132–133; Posner, 1976, pp. 225–226; Landes, 1983, p.
652; Posner, 1980, p. 409).
Others argue that subjecting individuals to punishment would be more direct
and provide individuals greater incentive to avoid the offending conduct.31 A third
position would subject both corporations and individuals to penalties. In some
31 Calkins points out that corporate punishment of an employee could subject the corporation to
public disclosure and/or whistle-blowing by the employee. He concludes,
Without the threat of individual liability, a corporation could not raise an employee’s per-
ceived chance of discovery sufficiently high to deter price-fixing, given the limited penalties
the corporation can impose.
He adds that corporation have little, if any, control over former employees (Calkins, 1997, p. 142;
see also Blair, 1985, pp. 433, 436–439; Dau-Schmidt, 1983, p. 75; Beckenstein and Gabel, 1985, p.
673; Werden and Simon, 1987, p. 930).
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cases the corporation is indistinguishable from the individual. If only corporations
are punished, the individual would simply withdraw assets from the corporation. If
only individuals could be punished, they could shelter their assets in the corpora-
tion. Punishing both individuals and corporations eliminates incentives to engage
in such inefficient transfers of assets. The third approach provides incentives for
both the firm and the individual to police for behavior contrary to the antitrust laws
(Calkins, 1997, p. 144).
2. DOJ PRACTICES
Table VIII records the DOJ practice in charging firms and/or individuals involved
in CCH cases for 1955–1997. Firms are cited frequently. Since 1955, 6,589 firms
were cited in 2,369 CCH cases or 88 percent of the total CCH cases while 2,802
individuals were cited in 1,069 CCH cases or 40 percent of the cases. Nearly every
case (98 percent) during 1955–1980 involved a firm as a defendant.
Comparing 1980–1997 with 1955–1979, the number of cases citing firms de-
creased 15 percent but the number of firms as defendants fell by 61 percent. The
percent of CCH cases involving firms declined, therefore, to 78 percent. The pattern
was different for individual defendants. CCH cases with individuals as defendants
increased by 80 percent although the number of individuals involved decreased by
35 percent. The result was an increase in the percentage of CCH cases in which
individuals were cited from 29 percent to 50 percent in spite of a decrease in
the number of individuals involved.32 Antitrust enforcement has shifted from the
Becker position that punishment should be imposed primarily on firms to a position
where both individuals and firms should be punished.
3. CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
Table IX reports CCH criminal cases by type of defendant. A striking fact is that
nearly every criminal case from 1955 to 1972 involved a firm as a defendant
whereas since 1972 this is no longer the case. Despite this, more criminal suits
were filed against firms in the eighteen years since 1979 than during the previous
twenty-five years (1955–1979). In each of the five-year periods during the 1980s,
the number of criminal suits against firms was more than twice the number in any
previous five-year periods – reaching a pinnacle in 1980–1984. Over the entire
period since 1955, 81 percent of criminal cases involved firms as defendants.
32 The comparisons between 1955–1979 and 1980–1997 must recognize the significant decreases
in both the number of firms and individuals involved in CCH cases. Since the number of firms
involved fell by 61 percent and the cases citing firms fell by 15 percent, the number of firms per
case fell from 3.7 for 1955–1979 to 1.7 for 1980–1997. Since the number of individuals cited fell by
35 percent and the number of CCH cases involving individuals increased 80 percent, the number of
individuals cited per case fell from 4.4 for 1955–1979 to 1.6 for 1980–1997. Eventhough the number
of CCH cases increased by 6 percent between the periods, the number of firms and individuals per
case and in total decreased significantly.
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Table VIII. Defendants CCH cases
Year # of # of CCH % of CCH # of # of CCH % of CCH
firms cases cases indiv. cases vases
involving involving involving involving
firms firms indiv. indiv.
1955 185 40 100 117 21 53
1956 142 35 97 58 9 25
1957 230 49 100 61 19 39
1958 211 51 100 30 9 18
1959 267 62 98 79 19 30
1955–59 1,035 237 99 345 77 32
1960 367 87 100 98 21 24
1961 213 58 98 46 12 20
1962 394 91 100 192 40 44
1963 131 34 100 33 10 29
1964 250 67 100 77 16 24
1960–64 1,355 337 99 446 99 29
1965 141 36 100 38 6 17
1966 123 39 100 60 14 36
1967 137 52 100 71 11 21
1968 170 50 100 42 9 18
1969 114 44 100 9 3 7
1965–69 685 221 100 220 43 20
1970 181 60 100 41 11 18
1971 117 43 100 19 7 16
1972 214 81 100 51 14 17
1973 149 49 98 52 11 22
1974 195 47 94 70 19 38
1970–74 856 280 99 233 62 22
1975 139 40 95 69 20 48
1976 200 45 96 121 20 43
1977 147 42 93 77 22 49
1978 178 44 96 96 19 41
1979 155 36 86 89 20 48
1975–79 819 207 93 452 101 46
1980 157 84 76 108 59 53
1981 103 63 90 69 44 63
1982 135 88 82 91 68 64
1983 176 93 85 129 72 66
1984 130 81 88 72 52 57
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Table VIII. Continued
Year # of # of CCH % of CCH # of # of CCH % of CCH
firms cases cases indiv. cases vases
involving involving involving involving
firms firms indiv. indiv.
1980–84 701 409 84 469 295 60
1985 60 39 93 24 16 38
1986 99 47 82 68 32 56
1987 118 74 76 92 45 46
1988 71 50 73 38 32 46
1989 95 56 74 46 37 49
1985–89 443 266 78 268 162 48
1990 104 45 65 87 41 59
1991 106 73 75 59 43 44
1992 83 56 67 66 41 49
1993 96 62 71 47 39 45
1994 81 44 81 39 21 39
1990–94 470 280 71 298 185 47
1995 66 47 80 20 17 29
1996 115 62 84 26 18 25
1997 44 23 77 25 10 33
Total 6,589 2,369 88 2,802 1,069 40
Source: See Source for Table I.
Note: Civil/criminal contempt, investigation, ancillary civil and information suits are
eliminated from the list of cases.
The number of criminal cases involving individuals shows a steady upward
trend by semi-decades except for 1965–1969, 1985–1989, and 1990–1994. In the
eighteen years since 1979, more than twice as many criminal cases involved in-
dividuals as defendants than in the previous twenty-five years. In each five-year
period, however, the percentage of criminal cases involving individuals is smaller
than that involving corporations or firms as defendants. Over the entire period since
1955, 60 percent of the criminal cases had individuals as defendants compared with
the 81 percent involving firms as defendants. The increase in individuals as defend-
ants is further evidence of the shift from Becker’s view that primarily firms should
be prosecuted to the more pragmatic third view that both individuals and firms are
appropriate subjects for criminal prosecutions depending on the circumstances and
the nature of the violation.
Table X arrays individual criminal defendants by position in the firm. Dur-
ing 1955–1997, 1,732 corporate officials were listed as defendants in criminal
CCH cases. Presidents comprise the largest category with 912, followed by 504
vice-presidents, 120 owners, 112 directors, and 84 secretaries and/or treasurers.
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Table IX. Criminal cases by firm and individual defendants
Year Criminal cases Criminal cases % %
with firms with individuals Of criminal of Criminal
as defendants as defendants cases with cases with
firms as individuals
defendants as defendants
1955 21 15 100 71
1956 16 9 94 53
1957 26 16 100 62
1958 26 8 100 31
1959 34 11 100 32
1955–59 123 59 99 48
1960 31 12 100 39
1961 19 12 95 60
1962 38 32 100 84
1963 17 9 100 53
1964 21 14 100 67
1960–64 126 79 99 62
1965 8 5 100 63
1966 19 14 100 74
1967 13 10 100 77
1968 16 8 100 50
1969 1 1 100 100
1965–69 57 38 100 67
1970 10 8 100 80
1971 9 6 100 67
1972 23 13 100 57
1973 19 11 95 55
1974 27 19 90 63
1970–74 88 57 96 62
1975 25 17 93 63
1976 24 19 92 73
1977 25 21 89 75
1978 31 19 94 58
1979 16 15 73 68
1975–79 121 91 89 67
1980 56 56 69 69
1981 49 44 88 79
1982 71 67 79 74
1983 85 71 84 70
1984 65 51 86 67
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Table IX. Continued
Year Criminal cases Criminal cases % %
with firms with individuals Of criminal of Criminal
as defendants as defendants cases with cases with
firms as individuals
defendants as defendants
1980–84 326 289 81 72
1985 33 15 92 42
1986 40 31 80 62
1987 59 44 72 54
1988 40 28 69 48
1989 50 37 71 53
1985–89 222 155 75 52
1990 31 39 56 71
1991 60 40 73 49
1992 47 36 66 51
1993 53 38 68 49
1994 19 19 68 68
1990–94 210 172 67 55
1995 28 17 70 43
1996 32 18 73 41
1997 2 8 25 100
Total 1,335 983 81 60
Source: Gallo et al., 1994, Table 3 with updates.
Note: Includes only criminal cases. Criminal contempt, investigation, statement,
obstruction and information suits are not included.
The majority seem to be high-ranking corporate officials. Non-corporate officials,
including division and department managers and others,33 total 794 individuals
during the period. The overall number of individual defendants decreased in the
1980s.
4. CIVIL DEFENDANTS
As reported in Table XI, corporate officials comprised the largest category of civil
defendants with 140 (51 percent). Owners comprised the largest group within this
category with 55. Presidents (31), directors (28), vice presidents (13), and secretar-
ies and/or treasures (13) follow. The number of division and department managers
33 The category “others” includes such organizational personnel as section, subsection, and





















Table X. Breakdown of individual defendants involved in criminal antitrust cases by position in the firm
Periods
Position 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
in – – – – – – – – –
Firm 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1997
# % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # %
Director 14 5 12 3 16 8 12 5 17 4 19 4 7 3 12 5 3 5
Owner 45 16 5 1 6 3 11 5 16 4 8 2 9 4 14 5 6 10
Pres. 66 23 116 32 72 35 96 43 143 34 248 54 108 42 49 19 14 23
V. Pres. 50 18 108 30 27 13 45 20 83 20 109 24 50 19 20 8 12 20
Sec./Treas. 16 6 10 3 6 3 7 3 20 5 17 4 7 3 – - - 1 2
Corp. Offic 191 67 251 70 127 63 171 77 279 66 401 88 181 70 95 37 36 60
Others 93 33 107 30 62 30 50 22 141 33 43 9 75 29 96 37 17 28
Missing – – – – 15 7 3 1 2 0.5 12 3 4 1 67 26 7 12
Oth/Miss 93 33 107 30 76 37 53 23 143 34 55 12 79 30 163 63 24 40
Total 284 100 358 100 204 100 224 100 422 100 456 100 260 100 258 100 60 100
# %
Total Corporate Officers 1,732 69
Total Dept. Managers/Others 684 27
Missing 110 4
Total Individuals 2,526 100
Source: Gallo et al., 1994, Table 4 with updates.
Note: Based on Criminal CCH cases in which individuals were defendants. Criminal contempt, investigation, statement, obstruction and
information suits are not included.
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and others (as defined in footnote 33) named as defendants amounted to 103 (37
percent).
VII. Disposition of Cases and the Department’s Won-Lost Record
A charge brought by the DOJ can be resolved in a number of ways including a plea
of guilty, nolo contendere, or not guilty leading to a verdict or a consent decree.
How cases are resolved will be influenced by the DOJ’s success in selecting and
prosecuting cases and the incentive for the parties to negotiate or litigate given
the possible penalties. By examining the statistics on the resolution of DOJ cases,
insight can be gained as to the effectiveness of the DOJ under current and past
systems of prosecution and possible penalties.
1. PLEAS
The disposition of most criminal cases is based upon a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere34 rather than a trial resulting in a verdict by a jury or judge.35 A verdict
of not guilty, of course, may mean merely that the jury or judge determined the
prosecution did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt – a criterion imposed
by law to find the defendant guilty. If a guilty verdict is rendered, the court formally
enters a judgement of conviction unless there is a legal reason for not doing so
(Miller et al., 1991, p. 8).
Table XII records the pleas used in DOJ criminal antitrust cases. It shows the
importance of nolo contendere pleas; until 1979, 88 percent of the defendants con-
victed from 1955 through 1979 offered a plea of nolo contendere. Posner reported
slightly more than 73 percent of all criminal convictions were disposed of through
nolo contendere pleas from 1890 to 1969 (Posner, 1970, p. 390).
Nolo contendere pleas decreased significantly beginning in 1980. This may be
the result of the Antitrust Division’s opposition to such a plea if (1) the defend-
ant is not subject to the same penalties as a guilty plea, (2) the violation was
blatant or (3) the conviction would substantially aid private plaintiffs to recover
in treble damage actions (Sullivan, 1977, p. 758). It may also have resulted from
34 Nolo Contendere is a plea by the defendant in a criminal action. It has the effect of an admission
of guilt in the matter before the court and subjects the defendant to punishment but leaves open the
possibility for the defendant to deny the alleged facts in other proceedings. Sometimes contracted to
nolo. [Latin, “I do not wish to contend.”]
Even with a nolo plea, a criminal case can aid a private plaintiff. Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure forbids disclosure of evidence received by the grand jury except to the attorneys
of parties to the proceeding as needed for the performance of their duties, or directed by the court.
In the Electrical Equipment cases, however, the court admitted such evidence in subsequent private
treble damage cases (Sullivan, 1977, pp. 768–769).
35 For serious offenses, approximately 90 percent of convictions are obtained by a plea of guilty or






















Table XI. Breakdown of individual defendants involved in civil antitrust cases by position in the firm
Periods
Position 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
in – – – – – – – – –
Firm 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1997
# % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # %
Director 6 10 9 10 0 0 2 22 6 20 0 0 3 38 1 3 1 9
Owner 23 38 12 14 6 38 0 0 1 3 0 0 2 25 1 3 10 91
President 3 5 8 9 2 13 0 0 14 48 3 23 0 0 1 3 0 0
Vice Pres. 1 2 8 9 0 0 0 0 4 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sec./Treas. 3 5 5 6 0 0 0 0 3 10 1 8 0 0 1 3 0 0
Corp. Offic 36 59 42 48 8 50 2 22 28 93 4 31 5 63 4 10 11 100
Others 23 38 46 52 6 38 2 22 2 7 9 69 1 13 14 35 0 0
Missing 2 3 0 0 2 13 5 56 0 0 0 0 2 25 22 55 0 0
Others/Miss. 25 42 46 52 8 50 7 78 2 7 9 69 3 38 36 90 0 0
Total 61 100 88 100 16 100 9 100 30 100 13 100 8 100 40 100 11 100
# %
Total Corporate Officers 140 51
Total Dept. Managers/Others 103 37
Missing 33 12
Total Individuals 276 100
Source: See Source for Table I.
Notes: 1.Based on Civil CCH cases in which individuals were defendants. Criminal contempt, investigation, statement, obstruction and
information suits are not included.
2. Ancillary civil cases are not included in the count.
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Table XII. Nolo contendere pleas CCH criminal cases
Period Disposed of Other Total
in which on nolo convictions convictions
case was contendere
instituted Pleas Guilty Other
# % # % # %
1955–1959 478 79 126 21 0 0 604
1960–1964 677 87 100 13 0 0 777
1965–1969 458 93 34 7 0 0 492
1970–1974 490 92 40 8 1 0 531
1975–1979 751 88 96 11 9 1 856
1980–1984 200 24 619 75 5 1 824
1985–1989 36 9 343 89 5 1 384
1990–1994 3 1 250 99 0 0 253
1995–1997 0 0 64 96 3 4 67
Total 3,093 64 1,672 35 23 1 4,788
Source: See Source for Table I.
Notes: 1. Criminal contempt, investigation, statement, obstruction and inform-
ation suits are not included.
2. Other includes plea arrangement.
a DOJ memorandum directing U.S. Attorneys to oppose entry of a plea of nolo
contendere unless the Assistant Attorney General with supervisory responsibility
over the subject matter has approved (U.S. Department of Justice, 1978, pp. 3001,
3006).36
The recent increase in horizontal practices and price fixing cases may also be
responsible for the decrease in nolo contendere pleas. The DOJ considers these
to be serious violations of the antitrust laws and has sought heavy penalties with
increasing frequency. Such an increase in penalties might be expected to result
in an increase, rather than a decrease, in not guilty pleas in an effort to avoid the
heavy penalties (Snyder, 1990, p. 439). No support for Snyder’s position was found,
36 In explanation, the memorandum quoted a prior departmental directive:
One of the factors which has tended to breed contempt for federal law enforcement in recent
times has been the practices of permitting as a matter of course in many criminal indictments the
plea of nolo contendere. . . . Uncontrolled use of the plea has lead to shockingly low sentences
and insufficient fines which are no deterrent to crime. . . . [A] person permitted to plea nolo
contendere admits guilt for purposes of imposing punishment for his acts and yet, for all other
purposes, and as far as the public is concerned, persists in his denial of wrongdoing. It is no
wonder that the public regards consent to such a plea by the Government as an admission that it
has only a technical case at most and that the whole proceeding was just a fiasco (Id.).
The memo also noted that if the Government should seek civil sanctions against the defendant at
a later date, acceptance of a nolo plea might require the Government to expend valuable resources in
proving the same facts as were at issue in the criminal case (Miller et al., 1991, pp. 923–924).
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however. During the last decade, penalties imposed on antitrust violators have in-
creased appreciably. In analyzing the supporting data, we found the percentage of
not guilty verdicts to total verdicts, however, fell from slightly more than 1 percent
during 1980–1984 to less than 0.13 percent during 1985–1997.
2. CONSENT DECREES
The DOJ’s consent decree practice has been and continues to be a major element
in its enforcement program.37 Table XIII indicates 95 percent of all defendants
in CCH civil cases, in which the government had a favorable outcome, reached
settlements by consent decrees since 1955. Posner found slightly less than 76
percent for 1890 through 1969 (Posner, 1970, p. 375). Hills reports more than
80 percent of civil cases were disposed of by consent decree during the period
she examined (Hills, 1971, p. 537). The percentage of civil defendants reaching
settlement through consent decrees remained fairly constant over the period of
our study. Since 1985, 97 percent of all civil antitrust defendants have reached
settlements through consent decrees.38
37 The Antitrust Division does not initiate negotiations but is ready to enter into them upon ini-
tiation by the other side. Early in the negotiation the Division may seek to obtain relief which it
would seek at trial. It is more flexible, however, in negotiating a settlement than it is in pressing for
relief at the end of successful litigation. The likelihood of substantial compromise depends upon the
assessment of the risks and likely outcome of the litigation (Sullivan, 1977, p. 758).
38 Although consent decrees are a very valuable enforcement tool for the DOJ, they are not without
problems. Consent decree procedures may be marked by political favoritism and influence peddling.
This raises serious ethical issues about the reliability of the procedures. There is also the possibility
that the DOJ may make a poor settlement simply because of the ordinary risks and pressures faced
by the litigation staff.
The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974 provides a response to these problems by
requiring the DOJ to file for the industry and public consideration and comment, a copy of the
proposed decree and a public impact statement which analyzes the theory and predicts the effects of
the decree. The court entering the decree is then required to hold a hearing on the decree and, after
receiving such presentations as may be made about its efficacy, must make findings as to the effects
to be expected from the decree and about whether the decree is in the public interest.
These procedures provide an opportunity for a wide range of individuals not party to the litigation
to make their concerns known to the Division and to the court considering the decree. Prior to the
passage of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, the Division made proposed decrees
public at least 30 days before entry and invited comments from interested individuals which were
evaluated before entry. Individuals most likely to have much to say about the pending consent decree
are those who would have done so under the old law by making their concerns known to the Division
during its voluntary thirty day period and by amicus memoranda to the court considering the decree.
These individuals are likely to be treble damage suitors interested in gaining the prima facie evidence
effect that section 5(a) of the Clayton Act accords to decrees in litigated cases, but not to consent
decrees (Sullivan, 1977, pp. 758–759).
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Table XIII. Consent decrees CCH civil cases
Period Other judgements Total
in which in favor of judgements
case was Consent decrees government in favor of
instituted # % # % government
1955–1959 229 88 31 12 260
1960–1964 435 96 17 4 452
1965–1969 239 91 23 9 262
1970–1974 287 93 21 7 308
1975–1979 123 79 32 21 155
1980–1984 147 96 6 4 153
1985–1989 43 100 0 0 43
1990–1994 86 98 2 2 88
1995–1997 110 96 5 4 115
Total 1,699 93 137 7 1,836
Source: See Source for Table I.
Notes: 1. Criminal contempt, investigation, statement, obstruction and in-
formation suits are not included.
2. Other includes plea arrangement.
3. WON-LOSS RECORD
In Tables XIV–XVII the DOJ’s won-lost record is presented in a number of ways.
Table XIV reports the won-lost record for cases and CCH cases. The won-lost
record in CCH cases for type of violation alleged is given in Table XV and for type
of defendant in Tables XVI–XVII.
A CCH case or case is classified as a win if at least one defendant in the case
is convicted. The win classification includes verdicts of guilty, plea arrangements,
consent decrees, no contest, nolo contendere and injunctions to prevent merger.39
Plea arrangements are classified as a win on the assumption that the government
gained something, if not all it desired, from the plea arrangement. Losses included
verdicts of not guilty, dismissed, acquitted, dropped cases and hung juries. A CCH
case in which a verdict has not been rendered as of this writing is excluded in the
won-lost calculation.
Table XIV reflects the continuation of the long history of DOJ success first
reported by Posner (1970, p. 382). He found the DOJ won at least 64 percent of its
cases in each half decade from 1910 to 1967. Its won-lost record reached a high
water mark in 1925–1929 when it won 93 percent its cases. Our findings indicate an
even stronger record of success. The DOJ won 83 percent of cases and 86 percent
of CCH cases from 1955 through 1997. During the five-year periods, 1980–1984
39 Posner’s definition of a win includes guilty, consent decrees and nolo contendere pleas but he
makes no statement about the other verdicts (Posner, 1970, p. 381).
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Table XIV. DOJ’s won-lost record cases and CCH cases
Year Number Number Percentage Percentage won CCH cases
of closed of closed won Civil Criminal Total
cases CCH cases cases
1955 28 32 89 93 81 86
1956 20 25 80 75 53 60
1957 28 46 93 95 84 89
1958 37 47 84 86 85 85
1959 30 55 80 81 91 87
1955–59 143 205 85 87 81 84
1960 24 51 79 81 97 90
1961 39 54 69 74 74 74
1962 48 85 79 68 71 69
1963 27 34 82 77 88 82
1964 42 67 76 78 86 81
1960–64 180 291 77 75 82 78
1965 26 36 85 82 88 83
1966 28 38 82 74 100 87
1967 26 52 77 80 100 85
1968 44 50 61 47 94 62
1969 36 43 72 67 100 67
1965–69 160 219 74 69 97 76
1970 48 60 81 78 90 80
1971 35 42 63 61 100 69
1972 64 81 78 71 91 77
1973 39 50 77 63 90 74
1974 34 50 91 85 97 92
1970–74 220 283 78 71 94 78
1975 31 42 87 60 93 81
1976 38 47 87 81 81 81
1977 29 45 79 59 96 82
1978 34 46 85 77 94 89
1979 28 40 89 78 96 88
1975–79 160 220 86 71 92 84
1980 40 108 90 85 96 94
1981 16 70 88 79 96 94
1982 23 105 87 88 90 90
1983 23 107 96 83 92 92
1984 19 90 100 100 87 89
1980–84 121 480 92 87 92 91
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Table XIV. Continued
Year Number Number Percentage Percentage won CCH cases
of closed of closed won Civil Criminal Total
cases CCH cases cases
1985 14 34 100 100 100 100
1986 12 50 92 67 82 80
1987 14 82 93 92 99 98
1988 14 54 86 83 96 94
1989 12 65 83 75 93 92
1985–89 66 285 91 84 94 93
1990 15 39 87 75 94 90
1991 21 69 91 88 97 96
1992 15 52 100 100 100 100
1993 13 47 92 83 95 94
1994 16 26 94 88 94 92
1990–94 80 233 93 87 96 95
1995 19 42 90 86 96 93
1996 28 59 96 96 100 98
1997 10 10 90 90 – 90
Total 1,187 2,327 83 77 92 86
Source: See Source for Table I.
Note: Civil/criminal contempt, investigation, ancillary civil and information suits are
eliminated from the list of cases.
and 1985–1989, the DOJ’s won-lost record approached or matched the high water
mark of 93 percent achieved in 1925–1929. The DOJ’s won-lost record in criminal
prosecution is generally higher than in civil prosecution. Table XIV shows the DOJ
with an 92 percent winning record for criminal CCH cases compared to 77 percent
for civil CCH cases.
The DOJ’s won-lost record varies by the type of violation alleged as seen in
Table XV. From 1955 to 1997, the DOJ won 92 percent of the horizontal per se, 80
percent of the exclusionary practices, and 95 percent of the vertical restraint CCH
cases. The record in monopoly and merger cases is not as impressive – 64 percent
for monopoly (non-merger), 62 percent for horizontal merger, and 54 percent for
non-horizontal merger CCH cases. Since 1989, however, the DOJ’s won-lost record
in the horizontal merger area has increased significantly ranging from 67 to 100
percent.
When using defendants as the basis for analysis, Tables XVI–XVII show 86
percent of the firms and 82 percent of individuals prosecuted in criminal CCH
cases were convicted (Table XVI) compared to conviction rates of 75 percent for
firms and 76 percent for individuals in civil CCH cases (Table XVII).
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Table XV. DOJ’s won-lost record violations alleged CCH cases
Non-merger cases Merger cases
percentage won percentage won
HPSV MON EP VERT HM NHM
1955 100 100 70 100 100 –
1956 53 60 67 100 000 67
1957 87 000 100 100 000 –
1958 88 100 78 100 60 –
1959 93 40 82 – 40 67
1955–59 86 68 79 100 59 67
1960 97 71 83 – 67 000
1961 85 56 50 – 50 100
1962 73 60 50 100 67 50
1963 95 000 60 100 000 67
1964 87 100 100 000 64 50
1960–64 85 60 64 67 57 65
1965 94 – – – 80 75
1966 100 – 100 100 64 50
1967 100 – 100 – 83 33
1968 90 – 67 – 000 63
1969 75 000 100 – 47 50
1965–69 94 000 87 100 53 58
1970 80 – 100 – 57 20
1971 100 – 100 100 37 17
1972 93 – 79 100 35 –
1973 82 60 50 – 100 43
1974 97 100 100 – 60 50
1970–74 91 67 84 100 48 30
1975 91 – 000 – 50 –
1976 84 – 100 – 50 100
1977 94 100 100 – 50 000
1978 94 100 100 – 57 100
1979 92 – – – 89 000
1975–79 91 100 86 – 65 40
1980 96 – 000 100 71 100
1981 95 – – – 67 100
1982 91 – – – 86 –
1983 92 – – – 67 –
1984 88 – – – 100 –
1980–84 92 – 000 100 81 100
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Table XV. Continued
Non-merger cases Merger cases
percentage won percentage won
HPSV MON EP VERT HM NHM
1985 100 – – – 100 –
1986 84 – – – – –
1987 99 – – – – –
1988 96 – – – 000 –
1989 93 – – – 100 –
1985–89 95 – – – 80 –
1990 94 – 100 – 67 –
1991 97 – – – 86 –
1992 100 – 100 – 100 –
1993 95 – – – – –
1994 94 – – – 75 –
1990–94 96 – 100 – 79 –
1995 97 – 100 100 67 –
1996 100 100 100 100 100 –
1997 100 – – – 75 100
Total 92 64 80 95 62 54
Source: See Source for Table I. Categories as defined in Table V.
Note: Civil/criminal contempt, investigation, ancillary civil, and in-
formation suits are eliminated from the list of cases.
The DOJ’s won-lost record in the CCH criminal cases does not vary sig-
nificantly by type of defendant or by the position individuals held within the
corporation. Firms are convicted at about the same rate as individuals, and cor-
porate officials are convicted at the same rate as individuals holding middle
management positions. In civil CCH cases firms were convicted at the same rate as
individuals, however, the conviction rate does vary by the position held by the de-
fendant within the corporation. Individuals holding middle management positions
were convicted at a higher rate than corporate officials.
A number of factors might account for the higher won-lost records in criminal
as opposed to civil prosecutions. First, because of the large number of criminal
matters pursued, the DOJ has become more adept at criminal investigations and
prosecutions. Second, the DOJ has made greater and more effective use of vari-
ous investigative tools such as monitoring telephone calls of informants who are
cooperating with the DOJ, utilizing video or body wires to capture meetings of
co-conspirators with informants, and using search warrants more effectively in in-
vestigations. Third, the Division has made greater use of FBI and state investigation
testing facilities for fingerprint identification, handwriting analysis, identification
of typewriters used to type incriminating memos, and polygraph examinations
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Table XVI. Won/lost record of the DOJ based on defendants involved in criminal cases
Periods
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Defendants – – – – – – – – –
1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1997
A. Percentage 76 82 90 92 88 88 84 96 96
convicted firms
# of firms convicted 450 498 295 331 523 442 245 158 48




Director 21 100 94 67 82 84 100 100 100
Owner 76 60 100 100 63 100 80 100 100
President 70 77 97 90 77 87 69 91 100
Vice Pres. 76 80 93 91 76 82 89 100 100
Sec./Treas. 58 70 83 86 70 81 100 – –
Corp. officials 67 79 95 89 76 85 78 95 100
Others 64 79 100 94 85 74 86 93 100
Missing – – 93 33 100 83 100 91 –
# of individs.
convicted 154 279 197 200 333 382 139 95 19
# of individs.
verdict was
rendered 223 354 204 224 322 453 172 102 19
Conviction rate 66 79 97 89 79 84 81 93 100








Source: Gallo et al., 1994, Table 6 with updates.
Note: Includes only criminal cases. Criminal contempt, investigation, statement, obstruction and
information suits are not included.
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Table XVII. Won/lost record of the DOJ based on defendants involved in civil cases
Periods
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Defendants – – – – – – – – –
1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1997
A. Percentage 90 75 71 62 73 84 80 90 94
convicted firms
# of firms convicted 215 420 246 301 151 141 40 82 101




Director 100 44 – 100 17 – 100 – 100
Owner 95 71 100 – 0 – 50 100 100
President 100 100 100 – 0 67 – – –
Vice Pres. 100 33 – – 0 – – – –
Sec./Treas. 100 100 – – 100 100 – – –
Corp. Off. 96 70 100 100 13 75 75 100 100
Others 100 52 100 0 100 100 0 67 –
Missing 100 – 100 100 – – – 20 –
# of individs. 45 32 16 7 4 12 3 6 11
convicted
# of individs. 46 51 16 9 17 13 5 12 11
verdict was
rendered
Convict. rate 98 63 100 78 24 92 60 50 100








Source: See source for Table I.
Note: Includes only criminal cases. Criminal contempt, investigation, statement, obstruction and
information suits are not included.
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(Whalley, 1988, p. 571). Fourth, criminal cases typically involve “hard-core” per
se violations such as price fixing, bid rigging and market allocations in which the
defendants have clear notice. The per se concept can be applied strictly and the
illegality of the practice is clear.40 Finally, the DOJ’s criminal convictions since
1981 have dealt almost exclusively with small firms (Table I and Kovacic, 1989,
pp. 173–206). Such firms do not have the resources to devise effective compliance
programs, to hire good legal advice, to keep careful records outlining the pro-
competitive, efficiency-related basis for their actions, and to hire the quality of legal
counsel and expert witnesses necessary for a successful defense. As will be seen
later, these factors also increased the sanctions imposed in criminal convictions.
In summary, the Department’s won-lost record in the last decade has risen
significantly from the already high levels of the past. This increase reflects the
advantages of criminal prosecution discussed previously and the increase in the
level of criminal enforcement effort involving such issues as price fixing for which
the standard of illegality is well established.
VIII. The Length of Antitrust Proceedings
A number of problems arise in measuring the length of an antitrust case using
the CCH Bluebook. It rarely indicates the duration of litigation in cases that are
settled. Also most antitrust cases are terminated either by a nolo contendere plea in
a criminal case (Table XII) or by a consent judgement in a civil case (Table XIII).
To include all consent and no-contest antitrust cases in calculating the length of the
average case would underestimate significantly the length of contested proceed-
ings. It is equally misleading, however, to exclude all cases in which a consent
judgement or nolo contendere plea was entered from the calculation of the length
of the average case because some such cases involve substantial litigation. Cases
ended by consent judgements or nolo contendere pleas were included for all CCH
cases for which settlement took place within the time periods indicated. Crim-
inal contempt, investigations, statements, obstruction and information proceedings
were excluded as they have been throughout our calculations.
To maintain a degree of consistency, we followed Posner in defining a litigated
case as a case which the Bluebook indicated involved litigation or took more than
six months to settle (Posner, 1970, pp. 374–375). As a result, the figures for litig-
ated cases includes some cases that involved little or no litigation but simply took
longer than six months to settle while some cases that involved more litigation but
took less than six months to settle were excluded.
The length of an antitrust case was calculated as the interval between the filing
of the complaint and the entry of the final judicial order. Later orders to reopen the
case for modification of the decree were not treated as extending the length of the
case.
40 See standards set in U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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Table XVIII. Length (months) of proceedings CCH cases
Period
in which Litigated All
case was All civil litigated
instituted Criminal Civil cases cases cases
1955–59 9 18 13 29 22
1960–64 16 28 23 36 30
1965–69 19 26 24 35 32
1970–74 15 27 23 38 32
1975–79 12 21 15 26 21
1980–84 4 15 6 20 17
1985–89 4 3 4 21 12
1990–94 5 3 5 10 25
1995–97 4 5 4 13 11
Source: See Source for Table I.
Note: Criminal contempt, investigation, statement, obstruction
and information suits are not included in the list of criminal cases.
Posner’s results indicated little trend or pattern in the average length of
CCH cases from 1890 to 1964 (Posner, 1970, Table 7, p. 377). As recorded in
Table XVIII, the average length of all cases increased from 1955–1959 to 1970–
1974 where it reached a peak in each category. After these peaks, each category
decreased in 1975–1979. The results for 1980–1989 are consistent with the en-
forcement policies of the Reagan-Bush administrations. The increased emphasis
on a narrow range of per se criminal cases produced a drastic decrease in the length
of criminal cases. The retreat from the frontiers of enforcement commented upon
earlier reduced the length of cases across all categories. The figures for the most
recent years will be influenced by the fact that many cases begun in that period
have not been settled. The increase in some of the categories may be indicative of
a broader range of enforcement which will be clearer when the results are more
complete and may result in an increase in future periods.
Criminal cases were generally disposed of more rapidly than civil cases and
litigated civil cases took longer on the average than all litigated cases as a group.
Posner reached similar results (Posner, 1970, Table 7). As discussed previously the
government tended to proceed with criminal prosecutions when the case was strong
and no substantial legal questions were involved. Where substantial legal questions
did arise, however, it proceeded with civil actions.
Table XVIII reflects also the large increase in the number and percentage of
CCH cases that were settled within six months since 1980. No such trend or pat-
tern is apparent in Posner’s results (Posner, 1970, Table 6). The increase in cases
settled within six months is a result of the increased emphasis on criminal antitrust
enforcement, as measured by the number and percentage of criminal CCH cases
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from 1975 through 1996 (Table IV). Given their narrow range and per se nature,
these cases do not generally involve protracted legal disputes.
The average lengths reported in Table XVIII were influenced by the highly
protracted cases–those taking more than six years to litigate. Only 82 CCH cases
from 1955–1997 lasted more than six years. One was completed in 1990, while the
remaining date to 1974 or earlier. These cases comprised a small fraction of the
DOJ’s enforcement effort and were limited to litigated civil cases prior to 1974.41
The fearsome reputation of antitrust cases for being protracted, which Posner found
to be undeserved (Posner, 1970, p. 376), is even less warranted for the 1955–1997
period.
IX. Criminal Sanctions: Fines and Incarceration
The nature of the sanctions imposed in criminal antitrust cases raise a number of
interesting questions.42 Two questions receive attention in this paper. First, have the
changes in legislation providing for harsher antitrust sanctions produced changes in
the sanctions actually imposed? Second, what changes have occurred in the relative
emphasis of judges in levying fines versus incarceration?
Tables XIX and XX provide results concerning sanctions imposed in criminal
antitrust cases. Table XIX reports the number of firms and individuals fined and
the average real fine (in 1982 dollars) per firm and per individual for completed
cases initiated in each year since 1955.43 It shows 2,908 firms and 1,431 indi-
viduals were fined during 1955–1997. The real fines were $160,000 per firm and
$21,048 per individual. Table XX indicates the number of individuals imprisoned,
the aggregate length of term served as well as the average term served per case and
per individual.44 Since 1955, 727 individuals have been imprisoned for violations
of the antitrust laws. The aggregate number of months served is 2,197.0 or 5.81
per case and 3.02 per individual. The details of Table XIX and XX permit some
observations to be made concerning the questions posed above.
41 A frequency distribution of the length of litigated civil CCH cases is available from the authors.
42 Authors of this paper have examined the issues discussed in this section in greater detail in Gallo
et al. (1994) and Craycraft et al. (1997). Other aspects of fines and imprisons included in these studies
include the incidence of maximum fines being levied and the optimality of the sanctions imposed as
a deterrent.
43 These results are related to Posner’s Tables 20 and 21 for 1890–1969. His analysis differs in
that fines are reported on a per “case” basis and fines are not adjusted for changing price levels. For
the period prior to the beginning of this study (1890–1954), his table shows 340 criminal convictions
in which 329 (97 percent) fines were imposed. The aggregate amount of these fines was $12,659,706
or $38,479.35 per case (1970, Tables 20–21, pp. 392–393).
44 This is related to Posner’s Table 19 which shows that prior to 1955, of the 340 convictions, 21 (6
percent) resulted in sentences of imprisonment. The terms ranged from 4 hours to 2 years aggregating
to 149.6 months. In the cases where incarceration was imposed, acts of violence or union misconduct
were usually involved. This accounts for the relative long average time spent of 7.12 months (Posner,
1970, pp. 389–391).
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Table XIX. DOJ criminal antitrust cases firm and individual real fines
(1982 = 100)
Year Number of Average Number of Average
firms fined real fine individuals real fine
per firm fined per individual
($000) ($000)
1955 35 20.788 28 20.352
1956 40 18.364 22 6.670
1957 114 13.321 32 4.918
1958 105 36.144 14 4.919
1959 124 39.588 32 14.635
1955–59 418 27.954 128 11.025
1960 154 45.299 54 9.415
1961 66 44.414 31 9.884
1962 114 44.081 89 13.073
1963 75 46.152 32 12.138
1964 81 40.718 62 11.558
1960–64 490 44.270 268 11.505
1965 53 71.636 31 9.715
1966 81 53.849 51 20.270
1967 60 43.735 50 9.089
1968 77 36.378 28 11.078
1969 3 98.765 1 98.765
1965–69 274 50.657 161 13.654
1970 43 39.203 28 14.162
1971 35 36.342 9 12.870
1972 76 36.579 43 11.928
1973 71 46.831 49 21.889
1974 105 54.388 59 19.612
1970–74 330 44.768 188 17.313
1975 91 33.985 41 11.380
1976 101 68.709 89 10.819
1977 103 121.276 62 25.680
1978 138 137.420 58 34.560
1979 80 179.638 36 47.941
1975–79 513 108.886 286 23.608
1980 90 226.075 49 27.830
1981 68 210.115 33 29.711
1982 86 211.598 35 18.847
1983 122 175.734 58 27.217
1984 73 110.295 37 25.119
1980–84 439 187.524 212 25.999
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Table XIX. Continued
Year Number of Average Number of Average
firms fined real fine individuals real fine
per firm fined per individual
($000) ($000)
1985 33 146.571 10 31.104
1986 54 304.617 27 47.003
1987 64 238.532 37 34.735
1988 39 293.793 9 33.077
1989 54 241.339 20 32.802
1985–89 244 250.174 103 37.078
1990 35 319.583 11 61.143
1991 50 324.521 26 50.085
1992 32 522.550 12 35.932
1993 24 642.361 16 29.877
1994 13 1324.373 7 60.517
1990–94 154 498.484 72 45.939
1995 19 1345.821 6 67.840
1996 27 3766.262 7 53.537
1997 0 00.00 0 00.00
Total 2,908 160.000 1,431 21.048
Source: Gallo et al., 1994, Table 9 with updates.
Notes: 1. Criminal contempt, investigation, statement, obstruction and
information suits are eliminated from he list of criminal cases.
2. Intra-industry organization fines are included in the calculation of
firm fines.
3. Suspended fines are excluded.
4. Number of intra-industry organizations is included in the number of
firms that were fined.
5. Real individual fines were calculated by dividing nominal individual
fines by the consumer price index (1982 = 100). Real firm fines were
calculated by dividing nominal firm fines by the wholesale price index
(1982 = 100). The deflator year was determined by adding the litigation
period to the mid-year the case was initiated.
1. HAVE THE LEGISLATIVE CHANGES PROVIDING FOR GREATER
ANTITRUST SANCTIONS PRODUCED CHANGES IN THE SANCTIONS
ACTUALLY IMPOSED?
A. Legislation
The original Sherman Act specified a maximum fine of $5,000 per count for firms
and individuals and a maximum prison term of one year per count for individuals
who violated the statute. Efforts to increase the maximum fine were unsuccessful
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Table XX. DOJ criminal antitrust cases length of prison terms
Year Number of Aggregate Average Average
individuals length of prison prison
imprisoned prison terms term per term per
served case individual
(months) (months) (months)
1955 0 0 0 0
1956 0 0 0 0
1957 0 0 0 0
1958 0 0 0 0
1959 15 228.00 45.60 15.20
1955–59 15 228.00 45.60 15.20
1960 31 7.00 0.88 0.23
1961 0 0 0 0
1962 4 0.00 0.00 0.00
1963 0 0 0 0
1964 3 0.00 0.00 0.00
1960–64 38 7.00 0.64 0.18
1965 17 0.00 0.00 0.00
1966 12 4.00 2.00 0.33
1967 21 0.00 0.00 0.00
1968 8 0.00 0.00 0.00
1969 2 96.00 96.00 48.00
1965–69 60 100.00 12.50 1.67
1970 19 9.00 3.00 0.47
1971 6 0.00 0.00 0.00
1972 14 16.00 4.00 1.14
1973 26 4.00 0.67 0.15
1974 36 30.00 3.00 0.83
1970–74 101 59.00 2.36 0.58
1975 12 15.00 3.00 1.25
1976 17 13.00 2.17 0.76
1977 43 131.00 10.08 3.05
1978 46 56.00 4.67 1.22
1979 11 9.00 2.25 0.82
1975–79 129 224.00 5.60 1.74
1980 73 189.00 4.11 2.59
1981 52 313.00 8.46 6.02
1982 52 270.00 5.91 5.23
1983 61 161.00 3.74 2.64
1984 35 73.00 2.52 2.09
1980–84 273 1008.00 5.01 3.69
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Table XX. DOJ criminal antitrust cases length of prison terms
Year Number of Aggregate Average Average
individuals length of prison prison
imprisoned prison terms term per term per
served case individual
(months) (months) (months)
1985 6 2.00 0.33 0.33
1986 13 91.00 9.10 7.00
1987 29 84.00 5.25 2.90
1988 12 25.00 2.08 2.08
1989 10 75.00 7.50 7.50
1985–89 70 277.00 5.13 3.96
1990 13 99.00 9.00 7.62
1991 15 108.00 9.82 7.20
1992 4 34.00 8.50 8.50
1993 3 17.00 5.67 5.67
1994 2 7.00 3.50 3.50
1990–94 37 265.00 8.55 7.16
1995 1 3.00 3.00 3.00
1996 3 26.00 13.00 8.67
1997 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 727 2197.00 5.81 3.02
Source: Gallo et al., 1994, Table 10 with updates.
Notes: 1. Criminal contempt, investigation, statement, obstruction
and information suits are eliminated from the list of criminal cases.
2. Averages are calculated by dividing the aggregate amount of
prison term served by the number of cases in which prison terms
were imposed reported in Table VII and the number of individuals.
until 1955 when the maximum fine was increased to $50,000 per count (U.S. Con-
gress, 1957, p. 648; Gallo et al., 1994, pp. 48–50). Even this amount was small
given the probable payoff from anticompetitive behavior.45 As a reaction to the in-
adequacy of the 1955 increase, the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (APPA)
was enacted December 21, 1974,46 increasing the maximum fine to $100,000 for
individuals and to $1 million for corporations. It elevated violations of the Sherman
Act from a misdemeanor to a felony and provided a three year maximum prison
term per count.
45 Werden and Simon, using data from horizontal per se cases filed between 1975 and 1980,
estimated the economic harm was over 10 times the actual fines imposed (Werden and Simon, 1987,
p. 926).
46 Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered §§ of U.S.C. Vols.
15, 47 and 49). A legislative history is found in Kintner, 1978, Part I, Vol. I, Section F, Ch. 19.
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Efforts to increase the statutory limit on fines continued in 1984 with the pas-
sage of two additional acts. The Criminal Fine Enforcement Act (CFEA) increased
penalties for antitrust violations along with other federal crimes.47 The maximum
fine for an individual was increased to $250,000 while the corporate maximum
remained unchanged at $1 million per count. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
however, established sentencing guidelines for federal judges which permitted even
greater fines48 – up to twice the gross pecuniary gain of the defendant or twice the
pecuniary loss of the victim. This provided a possibility of substantially higher
fines particularly in a case involving a long-running conspiracy or a substantial
amount of commerce.49 The Antitrust Amendments Act of 199050 further raised
the statutory maximum fine to $10 million for corporations and $350,000 for
individuals for violations committed after November 16, 1990.
B. Fines Imposed
Table XIX permits a preliminary examination of the effects, if any, of the increases
in the statutory limits on the actual fines imposed.51
From 1890–1954, criminal fines levied under the Sherman Act were small rel-
ative to the probable gains from the crimes during this period. Prior to 1955, fines
were significantly below the $5,000 maximum – an average fine of less than $2,500
per count. This was the result of the low statutory maximum fine of $5,000 per
count and the hesitancy of judges to impose even these small maximums.52 Also,
during this time the DOJ did not charge defendants with non-antitrust offenses
related to the conspiracy – a recent practice which has increased the average penalty
significantly.
47 Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984 (CFEA), Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat. 3134 (1984)
(relevant portion codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3623). This statute raises the maximum fines for all federal
crimes committed after December 31, 1984.
48 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984)) superseded the
CFEA, but the maximum fines were not changed (18 U.S.C. Sess. 3557 (1984)). Those injured as a
result of antitrust violations also may sue and recover treble damages and costs, including attorney’s
fees. see 15 U.S.C. 15 (1982).
49 The double the damage/double the gain provision expired in November, 1987; however, it was
re-enacted in December of that year as the Criminal Fines Improvement Act of 1987 (Pub. L. 100-
185, 101 Stat 1279, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1 (1987)). Unless the conspiracy was committed totally within
the few months hiatus, any conspiracy, occurring whole in part after December 31, 1984, is subject
to these alternative fine calculations.
50 15 U.S.C. 1, Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990. Pub. L. 101-588 104 Stat. 2879 (1990).
51 A definitive examination would require a more detailed examination than is provided in
Table XIX. Cases brought under one set of sentencing guidelines could continue into the years after
the passage of the new statue. It would also take time for courts to react to the new sentencing
provisions. It is our intent to examine this issue in more detail, but the gross figures reflected in
Table XIX provides evidence of the effects of the passage of the various acts.
52 Gallo et al., 1994. See also U.S. Congress, 1954 Hearings. Posner found 340 defendants fined
in 329 cases with an average fine of $38,479.35 per case (Posner, 1970, Table 20).
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The maximum fines established in 1955 prevailed until the Antitrust Procedures
and Penalties Act (APPA) in 1974. During 1955–1974, 1,512 firms had aver-
age fines of $41,025 (1982 dollars) and the average fine for 745 individuals was
$13,352 (1982 dollars). The Sherman Act Amendments of 1955, which raised the
maximum fine from $5,000 to $50,000, resulted in an increase in fines, but less
than the ten-fold increase permitted by the increased maximum under the statute.53
Others have also found the amendment to the Sherman Act in 1955 had an impact
on the aggregate – and even more on the average – antitrust fine imposed (Gallo et
al., 1994, footnote 71).
The APPA Act (1974) doubled the fine per count for an individual and increased
the fine for a firm twentyfold. As would be expected it had a greater effect on fines
imposed on firms than individuals. A cursory examination of Table XIX indicates
fines imposed on firms increased more than threefold (from $41,025 [1955–1974]
to $145,149 [1975–1984]) while individual fines almost doubled (from $13,352 to
$24,626).
The CFFA and Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 were succeeded by the Antitrust
Amendments Act of 1990. During 1985–1989, the CFFA and Sentencing Reform
Act coincided with average real fines of $250,174 imposed on 244 firms and of
$37,078 on 103 individuals representing a further increases in fines in criminal
antitrust cases.
The Antitrust Amendment Act, along with continuing effects of Sentencing
Reform Act resulted in a fourfold increase in the average real fine for firms [from
$250,174 (1985–1989) to $1,020,131 (1990–1997)] while the fines for individuals
increased by less than 30 percent (from $37,078 to 48,111).
Each new statute since 1955 has resulted in a significant increase in average real
fines for both firm and individual defendants. The fines imposed on firms, how-
ever, have increased to a much greater extent (Gallo et al., 1994, pp. 48–54). The
increase in average real fines since 1977 also reflected, in part, the DOJ’s strategy
of charging some price-fixing defendants with non-antitrust offenses such as false
claims, false statements, wire fraud, perjury, or other non-antitrust counts. This
strategy of bundling non-antitrust offenses with price-fixing charges has been used
for approximately the past decade.54 Assuming a constant probability of detection
and punishment, the increases over this period would represent an increase in the
deterrence of antitrust offenses.
53 Posner reported that average nominal fine per case for the period 1890–1954 was $38,479
compared with $122,326 for the period 1960–1964, less than a fourfold increase (Posner, 1970,
p. 390).
54 Posner’s study covered the period prior to the time the DOJ adopted the strategy of bundling
together price-fixing charges with non-antitrust offenses. Consequently, his study did not include any
analysis of the impact of this strategy on average real fines (1970).
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2. WHAT CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED IN THE RELATIVE EMPHASIS ON
FINES OR INCARCERATION?
A. Fines or Incarceration
Should individuals convicted of violations of antitrust laws be punished with fines
or imprisonment. Following Becker’s general model (Becker, 1968, pp. 193–198),
Posner concluded that antitrust offenses were prime candidates for fines (Posner,
1976, 1980, pp. 409–410). Antitrust offenses are generally non-violent offenses,
without any need for incapacitation, in which there is usually at least one deep
pocket defendant who can be made to pay a commensurate fine. Where possible,
fines are to be preferred to incarceration so as to avoid the greater social costs of
imprisonment.
Others have argued that imprisonment represents a better deterrent. Werden
and Simon, for example, argue that hard-core price fixing is a serious and costly
crime and that it seems even its corporate defendants are unable to pay appropri-
ate fines (Werden and Simon, 1987, p. 920). Blair argues that short, frequently
imposed prison sentences along with infrequent large fines is an optimal sanction
(Blair, 1985). Dau-Schmidt contends fines and imprisonment are not equivalent in
achieving a preference-shaping intent of the law especially in offenses such as price
fixing. Both fines and imprisonment change the relative cost of criminal behavior
but imprisonment has the added effects of changing the taste for criminal beha-
vior (Dau-Schmidt, 1983, pp. 75–100; see also Henderson, 1969; Flynn, 1967, pp.
1301 and 1308; Dau-Schmidt, 1990; Shavell, 1985; Polinsky and Shavell, 1984).
Calkins argues it is important for the protection of shareholders that individuals in
the corporation face the possibility of incarceration (Calkins, 1997, pp. 142–143).
B. Incarceration
Incarceration was rarely used from 1890 to 1954. Prison terms amounting to 149.6
months were imposed on twenty-one individuals and in less than 4 percent of the
DOJ’s criminal antitrust cases. In cases where incarceration was imposed, acts of
violence or union misconduct were usually involved. This accounts for the relative
long average time spent of 7.12 months (Posner, 1970, pp. 389–391).
Table XX reports the number of individuals incarcerated, the aggregate length
of prison terms served, the average prison term per case, and the average prison
term per individual for cases initiated since 1955 and completed as of this date. Of
the 1,780 individuals convicted since 1955 (Table XVI), prison terms were imposed
on 727 individuals (41 percent of the individuals convicted). They spent a total of
2,197.00 months in jail for an average prison term of 3.02 months per individual.
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It was not until after the 1959 McDonough case55 and the electrical equipment
cases (Gallo et al., 1994, pp. 30–32), that the frequency and the length of prison
terms increased significantly. With the passage of the Norris-La Gardia Act and the
Supreme Court’s opinion in U.S. v Hutcheson,56 the use of antitrust laws in pure
labor cases diminished significantly. It is not surprising, therefore, that the average
term served during this period decreased. The number of individual convicted from
1955 through 1974 was 214 serving aggregate sentences of 394.00 months (1.84
per individual).
Since 1970, the number and percentage of individuals imprisoned and the
average prison term per individual have increased significantly. Prior to 1970,
18 percent of the 624 convicted individuals were imprisoned for an average 1.1
months57 compared to 53 percent of the 1,156 convicted individuals (Table XVI)
imprisoned for an average of 2.93 months since 1970 (Table XX).
The attitude of courts with regard to the use of incarceration was changing prior
to the passage of the APPA in 1974. APPA provided legislative encouragement
for the change in sentencing practices in antitrust cases. During the period covered
by that legislation (1975–1984), 402 individuals served an aggregate of 1,225.77
months of imprisonment for an increase to a 3.06 months average.
The aggregate amount of time spent in jail during the two five-year periods
of the 1980s was higher than any previous five-year period. 1980–1984 repres-
ented the pinnacle to date for the use of imprisonment in punishing antitrust
offenders with prison terms of 1,008 months imposed on 273 individuals (3.69
months/individual).
Under new sentencing guidelines in the Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990,
41 individuals have served sentences totaling 294 months. The average sentence
served is 7.17 months matching levels which existed in 1890-1954 for labor-
related cases. In part the increase in prison sentences reflects changing attitudes
of Congress, DOJ and the courts reflected in the sentencing guidelines as to the
seriousness of antitrust crimes. As discussed earlier the DOJ has adopted recently a
strategy of bundling together non-antitrust offenses with antitrust allegations. This
is probably an additional factor in longer sentences although it is difficult, if not
impossible, to disaggregate the antitrust component from “bundled” sentences.
55 U.S. v. McDonough Co. CCH, 1955–1991, para. 69,695, at 76,737 (1959). For an analysis of the
impact that McDonough and the electrical conspiracy cases had on the imposition of prison terms,
see Gallo et al. (1994, pp. 30–32).
56 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
57 Because of union misconduct in U.S. v. Irving Bitz et al. 179 F. Supp. 80; CCH, 1955–1991,
para. 69,549 at 76,221 (1959), prison terms in this case were omitted in our comparison. In this case
prison terms amounting to 216 months were imposed on five individuals. Eleven individuals and one
corporation were involved in a two count indictment charging price fixing and monopolization under
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and a four count indictment charging extortion through the
threat of labor difficulties under the Hobbs-Anti-Racketeering Act. If this case was included in our
comparison, then prison terms amounting to 335 months were imposed on 113 individuals for the
period prior to 1970, or an average prison term of 2.96 months.
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Prior to 1955, it is clear that the courts behaved consistently with the Posner
position of relying primarily on fines in punishing antitrust offenders. Since 1955,
major reliance for deterrence remains on fines, but imprisonment has increased in
importance. Of the 1,780 individuals convicted of antitrust violations, 1,486 (83.5
percent) received fines while 727 (40.8 percent) received prison terms. Restricting
attention to 1974–1997, the percentage of individuals convicted (957) who were
fined is 71.8 percent while 53.7 percent faced imprisonment. The closest approach
to the imprisonment position was achieved in 1975–1984 when of 712 individuals
convicted, 70.2 percent were fined but 56.7 percent were imprisoned. It would
appear that the courts and DOJ take a pragmatic approach of fitting the punishment
to the crime rather than accepting exclusive reliance on fines or imprisonment
although there is an increased use of imprisonment as a component of effective
deterrence.
X. Conclusions
The statistics reported in this paper provide an important update of Posner’s earlier
study (1970). They do not exhaust, obviously, the reporting and analysis of DOJ
antitrust enforcement. Furthermore, DOJ enforcement is but one component of an-
titrust enforcement. Federal Trade Commission actions, private antitrust suits and
state actions also contribute important strands to the tapestry of American antitrust
policy. Nevertheless, the statistics reported in this article provide a detailed outline
of a variety of important characteristics of the efforts of the government agency
charged with the paramount enforcement responsibilities for our antitrust laws over
the entire history of that enforcement effort.
The statistics reported herein also provide a concise and comparable measure
of the DOJ antitrust enforcement effort which may be used in further empirical
studies. The statistics can be improved and extended in many ways going back to
the original court records and the files of the DOJ rather than relying upon CCH
summaries. This has been done to some extent by supplementing the CCH with
further information from LEXIS. More sophisticated statistical techniques may ex-
tract additional relations from the data. Nevertheless, our data set demonstrates that
the CCH Bluebook provides an invaluable source of information on DOJ antitrust
enforcement efforts. The University of Cincinnati and Wayne State College have
embarked upon a program to maintain and update the data reported in this study as
gleaned from the CCH Bluebook. The information reported herein can be found at
the following world wide web site:
http://academic.wsc.edu/socialsci/parker_c/doj.htm
Updates will be incorporated into this site as new information becomes available. It
is hoped these records will provide consistent and comparable measures of DOJ en-
forcement effort in a systematic way. Antitrust scholars and enforcement agencies
are expected to be the major beneficiaries of this program.
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